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Merenkulku mielletään suhteellisen turvalliseksi kuljetusmuodoksi vaikka merenkulku ammat-
tina onkin vaarallisempi kuin monet maissa sijaitsevat ammatit. Lisääntyvä automaatio, voi-
makas taloudellinen paine, miehistön määrän lasku, kasvavat alusten koot ja uudet, korkean 
riskin väylät kuten Arktiset väylät lisäävät kaikki osaltaan merenkulun kompleksisuutta. Yksi 
onnettomuus herättää suurta kansainvälistä huomiota (esim. Costa Concordia) ja ihmisten te-
kemät virheet lasketaan olevan merellisten onnettomuuksien syynä noin 80% tapauksista. Uusi 
turvallisuusajattelu kuitenkin näkee inhimillisen virheen liian mustavalkoisena ja pelkistävänä 
syynä onnettomuuksille. Systeemien ja niiden toimintaympäristön kompleksisuus tekee tule-
vaisuuden mahdollisten vaarojen ennustamisesta vaikeaa ellei mahdotonta. Kompleksisuus tuo 
riskien ja turvallisuuden hallintaan epävarmuuksia ja tästä syystä myös toimet, joilla riskejä 
pyritään hallitsemaan ovat usein puutteellisia. Tämän takia yllättäviä tapahtumia voi esiintyä, 
jotka vaativat ihmisiä sopeuttamaan ja mukauttamaan toimintaansa tilannekohtaisesti. Tämä 
kyky sopeutua ja mukautua yllättäen ilmenevän tilanteen vaatimuksiin on erittäin tärkeää 
turvallisuuden varmistamisen kannalta.     
 
Tämän työn tavoitteena on ymmärtää syvemmin kompleksisuuden vaikutusta turvallisuuden 
hallintaan erityisesti merenkulussa ja etsii vastauksia kysymykseen miten hallita ja johtaa tur-
vallisuutta, jos emme tarkalleen tiedä tai kykene ennustamaan kaikkia riskejä. Tämä työ pe-
rustuu niin teoreettisen kuin ammattikirjallisuuden analyysiin, jossa pyritään sitomaan ja hei-
jastamaan teoreettista viitekehystä artikkelien kautta merenkulkuun käytännön näkökul-
masta.  
 
Tutkimuksen tuloksena syntyi ymmärrys siitä, että ihmiset jotka konkreettisesti tekevät työn 
ovat avain asemassa turvallisuuden varmistamisessa. Turvallisuus voidaan nähdä systeemin 
ominaisuutena, joka on emergenssi. Se ei ole jotain, joka kerran luodaan ja jätetään sen jäl-
keen huomiotta vaan jotain joka dynaamisesti luodaan uudelleen ja uudelleen. Merenkulku on 
kehittänyt turvallisuuttaan tutkimalla jo tapahtuneita onnettomuuksia, mutta kompleksisuu-
desta johtuen määrätyn tilanteen olosuhteet voivat olla hyvin erilaiset ajankohdasta riippuen. 
Tästä syystä turvallisuus on myös tilannesidonnainen. Näin ollen jo tapahtuneiden onnetto-
muuksien tutkiminen merenkulun turvallisuuden parantamisessa tarvitsee rinnalle myös me-
nestyksen ymmärrystä. Jos halutaan ymmärtää mistä menestys ja näin ollen myös turvallisuus 
syntyy, tulee meidän tutkia myös menestystä, ei ainoastaan epäonnistumisia. 
 
Merenkulun turvallisuus on myös nähty hyvin pitkälle koostuvan sääntöjen, määräysten ja par-
haiden toimintatapojen kurinalaisesta noudattamisesta. Kompleksisuus kuitenkin vaatii sään-
töihin ja määräyksiin joustoa, jotta voidaan sopeuttaa toimintaa tilanteen vaatimalla tavalla. 
Yksi tapa hallita turvallisuutta joustavien määräysten alueella on sitouttaa ihmiset yritysten 
ydinarvoihin. Merenkulussa toimintaa ohjaavana ydinarvona voidaan pitää ”Hyvää Merimies-
taitoa”, jonka osana on myös merenkulkijan toiminnan turvallisuus. Tämä tutkimus osoittaa, 
että turvallisuus on paljon muuta kuin kirjalliset säännöt ja määräykset. Turvallisuus on ih-
misten mielessä, heidän asenteissaan ja päätöksissä, jotka johtavat toimintaa tiettynä ajan-
kohtana tietyssä paikassa ja joka useimmiten on menestyksekästä. Tämä myös korostaa johta-
juutta turvallisuuden kehityksessä.   
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Shipping is considered a relatively safe form of transport, but seafaring is still seen as a high-
risk profession. Increasing automation, high economical pressure, decreasing crew size, in-
creasing ship size, and new high-risk routes like the Arctic all introduce complexities into sea-
faring. One single accident, although very rare, gains a lot of international attention (e.g. 
Costa Concordia). Human error is stated as the cause of maritime accidents in approximately 
80% of the cases. However, new safety thinking sees “human error” as too narrow and sim-
plistic of a reason for accidents. Complexity of systems makes it difficult, if not impossible, 
to predict all possible paths to failure. Due to this uncertainty, the safety guards to prevent 
failures are most likely also insufficient. The unpredictability of exact future events requires 
humans to adapt and adjust performance according to the situational needs of unexpected 
events. This capability of performance variability is a crucial factor to ensure safety. 
 
The objective of this thesis is to understand the element of complexity and its impact on 
safety especially in shipping, and find answers to how safety can be managed and led if we do 
not know or cannot predict all risks. This thesis is a study and analysis of theoretical and pro-
fessional literature. The aim is to connect and reflect the theoretical framework into practice 
using maritime articles.  
 
The main findings are that humans, the ones at the sharp end doing the actual work, are vital 
for safety development. Safety can be seen as an emergent property of a system, which is dy-
namic and possibly changing from one moment to the next. Safety is not something that is 
once achieved and then left in a static mode, but something that is dynamically created again 
and again. Shipping has developed its safety by studying past accidents. Due to complexity, 
the specific situational conditions for an event in a particular space and time can be com-
pletely different for the similar event in another moment of space and time. Hence, safety is 
also situationally bound. Therefore, hindsight and study of past accidents might not be suffi-
cient to develop safety. In order to understand and ensure success, shipping should also study 
and focus on success, not only failure. 
 
The safety of shipping is widely seen as the result of compliance to rules, regulations and best 
practices. Complexity, however, requires more flexibility in rulemaking to ensure correct ad-
justments of performance. One way to manage safety in the area of flexible rule making is 
commitment to core values, which in shipping can be seen as the concept of “Good Seaman-
ship”. Safety is an integral part of seamanship, even though it might lie very deep in the tacit 
knowledge of professional seafarers. Therefore, this thesis also demonstrates that safety is 
much more than safety management systems, written rules and written international codes. 
Safety lies in the minds of humans, their attitudes and decisions leading to action in a partic-
ular moment that is usually successful. This also highlights the importance of leadership in 
safety development.  
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Tiivistelmä / Executive Summary 
 
Tämän työn tavoitteena on ymmärtää syvemmin kompleksisuuden ja epävarmuuden vaikutus 
merenkulun turvallisuuteen. Tutkimuksen keskiössä on merenkulkijat eli inhimillinen tekijä. 
Viimeisimmät turvallisuustutkimukset korostavat ihmiselementin tärkeyttä ja toiminnan mu-
kautumiskykyä vastata erilaisten tilanteiden vaatimuksiin. Tämä mukautumiskyky on edellytys 
onnistuneelle toiminalle. Näitä turvallisuuskäsityksiä ja hypoteeseja on peilattu merenkulkuun 
tässä työssä. Yksinkertaistettuna tämä työ etsii vastausta kysymykseen, miten voimme hallita 
ja johtaa turvallisuutta jos emme tiedä tarkalleen kaikkia riskejä? 
 
Turvallisuuden ja kompleksisuuden käsitteet ovat aika abstrakteja, joten tämän tutkimuksen 
metodit ja data ovat keskittyneet teoreettisen ja ammattikirjallisuuden tutkimiseen ja analy-
sointiin. Tämän lisäksi väistämättä tutkimukseen on tullut henkilökohtainen ote, koska työs-
kentelen merenkulun turvallisuuteen liittyvien projektien parissa samoin kuin olen myös kou-
lutukseltani merenkulun ammattilainen. Näiden projektien pohdinnat heijastuvat teoreettisiin 
synteeseihin ja luovat oman vivahteensa itse työhön. Työn ymmärtämisen logiikka on ollut ab-
duktiivinen argumentointi, joka sisältää niin vahvuuksia kuin heikkouksia. Tämä työ on teki-
jänsä näköinen, mutta samalla jättää oven auki uusille todisteille, jotka saattavat tuoda tässä 
työssä argumentoiduille asioille uuden käänteen. Tässä työssä ei esitetä absoluuttista totuutta 
vaan tavoitteena on valaista ihmiselementin tärkeyttä kompleksisessa ympäristössä sekä luoda 
pohjaa keskustelulle ja jatkotutkimuksille siitä, miten merenkulun turvallisuuden kehitystä 
kannattaa viedä eteenpäin. Turvallisuuden kehityksessä tulisi keskittyä muihin asioihin kuin 
vain läheltä piti tilanteiden tai onnettomuuksien tutkimiseen. Nämä varmasti kertovat omaa 
tarinaansa siitä miten turvallisuutta tulisi kehittää, mutta tämän työn tulosten perusteella se 
ei riitä. Turvallisuus on myös johtajuutta. Se on ihmisten johtamista ja voimaannuttamista 
turvalliseen toimintaan ja jatkuvaan kehitykseen. Se on niiden merimiesten johtamista, jotka 
elävät ja työskentelevät laivalla. He ovat se taho, joka luo turvallisuuden joka päiväisessä toi-
minnassa. Absoluuttista turvallisuutta ei ole eikä täydellisiä systeemejä. Ihmiset tekevät vir-
heitä ja systeemeissä on puutteita, mutta tämän ei pitäisi estää menestyksekästä toimintaa. 
Turvallisuutta ei ole olemassa ilman jatkuvaa toimintaa sen olemassa olon hyväksi.  
 
Seuraavat osiot esittelevät lyhyesti tämän työn tutkimustulokset. 
 
Turvallisuuden luonne 
 
 
Viimeisimmät tutkimukset esittävät, että turvallisuus on kompleksisen systemin emer-
genttinen ominaisuus. Turvallisuus on jotain mitä ei voi saavuttaa ja olettaa sen olevan staat-
tinen tila vaan jotain, jonka eteen tulee koko ajan tehdä töitä. Jokainen käsillä oleva hetki 
  
eroaa toisesta vastaavanlaisesta ja yhteenkietoutuneet tapahtumat muuttuvat dynaamisesti 
sitä mukaan kun aktiiviset toimijat osallistuvat tapahtumien kulkuun. Turvallisuus syntyy sys-
teemin erilaisten elementtien vuorovaikutuksessa tilanteessa jossa ne ovat aktiivisesti 
osallisia. Tämä tekee turvallisuuden luonteesta dynaamisen samoin kuin tilannesidonnaisen. 
Joskus kyseessä on vain tavallinen päivä töissä ja toisinaan taas turvallisuuskriiittinen tilanne, 
jossa tulee reagoida välittömästi. Syy, miksi merenkulussa tapahtuu onnettomuus määrätyssä 
ajassa ja paikassa ei kerro tyhjentävästi miten onnettomuudet voidaan varmuudella estää 
tulevaisuudessa. Tilanteet ovat hyvin harvoin identtisiä samoin kuin käytettävissä olevat 
resurssit kuten aika, saatavilla oleva informaatio, työvoima, osaaminen tai sääolosuhteet.   
 
Riskikartoitukset ovat riskiehallinnan tärkeä työkalu organisaation turvallisuuden kehit-
tyksessä. Uhkatekijöiden ennakointi samoin kuin niiden vaikutus ja potentiaalinen ilmentymä 
kuitenkin sisältää faktojen lisäksi myös oletuksia ja arvioita tulevaisuuden tapahtumista ja 
huolimatta siitä, miten huolella me ennakointia pyrimme tekemään, emme siltikään tule tie-
tämään tarkalleen miten asiat kehittyvät tulevaisuudessa. Tästä epätietoisuudesta syntyy 
epävarmuuksia, jotka aiheuttavat sen, että myös toimet joilla pyrimme tulevaisuuden riskejä 
hallitsemaan ja pienentämään myöskin voivat olla epätaydellisiä. 
 
Tästä syystä tarvitsemme myös muita työkaluja turvallisuuden kehittämisessä kuin ainoastaan 
riskien kartoitusta ja hallintaa. Jotta ymmärtäisimme, mistä menestys syntyy tulisi meidän 
tutkia menestyksekästä toimintaa sen lisäksi, että tutkimme menneisyydessä tapahtuneita on-
nettomuuksia ja läheltä piti –tilanteita. Kuten Hollnagel (2014) argumentoi, suurimman osan 
aikaa ihmisten tekemä työ on menestyksekästä ja onnettomuudet ovat loppujen lopuksi hyvin 
harvinaisia. Samoin on merenkulussa, mutta siitä huolimatta focus on hyvin pitkälle tapah-
tuneissa onnettomuuksissa ja läheltä piti -tilanteissa kun puhumme turvallisuuden ke-
hityksestä. Kompleksisissa systeemeissä tämä ei kuitenkaan riitä vaan turvallisuutta tulisi 
myös kehittää muilla keinoin.  
 
Turvallisuuden taktinen näkökulma 
 
Kompleksisessa ympäristössä turvallisuus on systeemin emergenttinen ja dynaaminen ominai-
suus, joka merenkulussa korostaa merenkulkijoiden suorituskykyä. Turvallisuuskriittisessä ti-
lanteessa resurssit ovat usein rajallisia, mutta merenkulkijat kompensoivat puuttuvia resurs-
seja tiedoillaan ja taidoillaan sekä kyvyllä mukautua tilanteeseen. He käyttävät sitä, mitä on 
saatavilla ja suurimman osan aikaa onnistuneesti. Tämä kääntää katseen turvallisuuden takti-
seen näkökulmaan. Strategisella tasolla fasilitoidaan turvallisuuden luominen, mutta itse tur-
vallisuus luodaan taktisella tasolla. Strategisella tasolla määritellään yrityksen toiminnan ta-
voitteet, resurssit ja investoinnit, tekniset ratkaisut, säännöt ja määräykset jne. Merenku-
  
lussa esimerkiksi merenkulun liikenteen koordinointia suunnitellaan strategisella tasolla luo-
malla reittijakojärjestelmiä tai monitorointia, mutta nämä kuitenkaan eivät tyhjentävästi 
takaa turvallisuutta. Huolimatta parhaimmista yrityksistä koordinoida ja monitoroida 
liikennettä, laivojen karilleajoja ja yhteentörmäyksiä tapahtuu silti. Näissä tilanteissa turval-
lisuus on loppujen lopuksi merenkulkijoiden taidoista kiinni ja mitä kompleksisemmaksi navi-
gointialueet menevät, kuten esim. Arktinen merenkulku tai jäänavigointi, sitä tärkeämmäksi 
turvallisuuden taktinen näkökulma tulee.  
 
Turvallisuuden takaaminen kompleksisessa ympäristössä vaatii toimijoilta hieman erilaisia tai-
toja kuin ennakoitavissa olevassa ympäristössä, jossa turvallisuus voidaan taata sääntöjä ja 
toimintaohjeita noudattamalla. Tämä asettaa myös uusia haasteita johtajuudelle ja samalla 
myös korostaa johtajuuden tärkeyttä varmistamaan se, että yllättävissäkin tilanteissa mie-
histö osaa toimia yhtenäisesti ja kollektiivisesti tilanteen vaatimalla tavalla linjassa sovittujen 
arvojen ja tavoitteiden kanssa. 
 
Jouston tarve 
 
Kompleksiset ja ennalta arvaamattomat tilanteet tekevät tarkkojen toimintaohjeiden 
tekemisestä vaikeaa ellei mahdotonta. Jotta yllättäviin tilanteisiin voitaisiin reagoida ja 
vastata mahdollisimman tehokkaasti, tulisi toiminnan ohjeistuksessa, säännöissä ja määräyk-
sissä olla joustoa ja päätöksenteko hajautettua. Usein he, jotka tekevät toimintaohjeita ovat 
erit kuin he, jotka niitä toteuttavat ja joskus näillä kahdella taholla on erilaiset näkemykset 
suoritettavasta työtehtävästä. Tutkimukset osoittavat, että merenkulkijat tekevät väliaikaisia 
oikoteitä (work-a-round) suorittaakseen työtehtävänsä, mutta kaikki eivät johdu 
välinpitämättömyydestä tai tietoisesta sääntöjen rikkomisesta. Välillä oikoteitä joudutaan 
tekemään turvallisemman tavan löytämiseksi tai rajallisten resurssien takia. Merenkulun tur-
vallisuus on nähty hyvin pitkälle koostuvan sääntöjen, määräysten ja parhaiden toimintatapo-
jen kurinalaisesta noudattamisesta. Kompleksisuus kuitenkin vaatii sääntöihin ja määräyksiin 
joustoa ja päätöksentekoon hajauttamista, jotta tilanteeseen voidaan reagoida sen vaatimalla 
tavalla. Säännöt, määräykset, parhaat toimintatavat ovat tapa kuvata yksinkertaisesti moni-
mutkaisia asioita. Jos eteen tulee tilanteita, joissa etukäteen kirjoitetut toimintaohjeet eivät 
enää päde, päätöksiä tulee tehdä sen tilanteen vaatimalla tavalla ja toimintaa siihen sopeut-
taen. Näissä tilanteissa liian tiukat toimintaohjeet voivat jopa heikentää turvallisuutta. 
 
Jos päätöksiä joudutaan tekemään siitä, päteekö tilanteeseen jo sovitut toimintatavat vai 
vaatiiko kyseinen tilanne niiden sopeuttamista, tulee päätöksen tekijällä oltava vaadittavat 
kyvyt ensinnäkin tunnistaa nämä tilanteet, mutta myös kyky tehdä perusteltuja päätöksiä 
siitä milloin toimintatapoja noudatetaan ja milloin ei. Päätösten ja toiminnan tulee olla lin-
jassa yrityksen määriteltyjen tavoitteiden kanssa. Yksi tapa hallita turvallisuutta joustavien 
  
määräysten alueella on sitouttaa ihmiset yritysten ydinarvoihin ja tässä taas korostuu johta-
juuden merkitys. Johtajuus on avain asemassa kun pyritään kehittämään turvallisuutta komp-
leksisuuden ja epävarmuustekijöiden vallitessa, jotta voidaan varmistaa, että tehdyt päätök-
set ja toimet ovat linjassa kokonaisvaltaisten tavoitteiden ja periaatteiden kanssa.  
 
Hyvä merimiestaito 
 
Merenkulussa toimintaa ohjaavana ydinarvona voidaan pitää hyvää merimiestaitoa, joka on 
ollut osa merenkulkua aikojen alusta. Hyvä merimiestaito on tarvittavaa käytännön ammatti-
taitoa kuten aluksen hallintaa ja työtehtävien menestyksekästä hoitamista, mutta myös asi-
oita kuten ammatillista ylpeyttä, kohteliaisuutta muita kanssakulkijoita kohtaan ja luonnon-
voimien kunnioitusta jne. Hyvällä merimiestaidolla ei ole universaalia määritelmää, mutta 
sitä kuitenkin käytetään laajasti merenkulussa. Hyvällä merimiestaidolla katetaan jopa laissa 
kohdat, joita ei voida kirjallisesti määrittää. Tutkimukset kuitenkin osoittavat, että meren-
kulkijat kokevat, ettei heidän merimiestaitoaan aina arvosteta toivotulla tavalla. Turvallisuus 
on myös osa hyvää merimiestaitoa ja tämä tutkielma haluaakin korostaa, että mitä kompleksi-
semmaksi toimintaympäristö muuttuu, sitä tärkeämmäksi hyvä merimiestaito tulee. Tästä 
syystä hyvää merimiestaitoa ei saisi rajoittaa säännöillä ja määräyksillä vaan yrityksen tulisi 
luoda sellaiset puitteet, jossa hyvää merimiestaitoa kunnioitetaan, kehitetään ja vaalitaan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Executive Summary 
 
 
This study has the aim to understand the impact of complexity and unpredictability on mari-
time safety focusing on the human element. Recent safety studies highlight the importance of 
performance variance and adaptability to prevailing situational conditions as a key for opera-
tional success. These hypothesis and ideas are reflected into maritime domain in this thesis. 
Basically this thesis is looking for answers to the question, that how do we ensure safety if we 
do not know all the risks? 
 
As safety and complexity are quite abstract concepts, the research methods and data collec-
tion relies mainly on theoretical and professional literature. The logic of reasoning to unders-
tand collected material has been abductive reasoning, which as such presents both strengths 
and weaknesses. This thesis is a construction of views of the author bringing insight to the 
concept of maritime safety and the importance of human element in the process of creating 
safety. This however is not the absolute truth, but a starting point for further discussion and 
research. Abductive reasoning gives the freedom to interpret found facts and to come to a 
conclusion based on these facts, but also leaves the door open for another interpretation as 
new facts appear. Hence, this thesis does not claim that the presented issues are the abso-
lute truth, but highlights the point, that there are larger issues to consider in safety develop-
ment than just investigating past accidents and creating new regulation or requiring compli-
ance to established procedures. Safety is also about leadership. It is about leading the people 
living and working at sea, their empowerment towards safety and continuous development. 
There are no such things than perfect systems or absolute safety. Humans make mistakes and 
systems fail, but that should not hinder overall successful operations and sustainable ship-
ping. Safety needs constant striving and effort, it does not just exist.  
 
The following sections will shortly present the main findings of this thesis. 
 
The nature of safety 
 
The nature of safety in the recent studies introduces safety as an emergent property of a 
complex system. Safety is not something that is once achieved and then left alone, but so-
mething that requires constant striving and effort. Each situation at hand is most likely diffe-
rent from the next and the intertwined events of our reality change as we intervene with our 
own actions. Safety is something that is created in the interconnection of different com-
ponents in a situation that the components are dynamically part of. This makes safety also 
dynamic in nature as well as situationally bound. Sometimes it can be just another day at 
  
work, sometimes responding to a highly safety critical incident. Why a maritime accident hap-
pens in a certain space and time does not sufficiently tell how we can avoid such an event in 
the future as no circumstances are absolutely the same neither are the exact resources at 
hand such as available information, manpower, tools at hand or weather conditions.  
 
Risks assessments are an important tool to improve and manage safety. However, predicting 
possible hazards, their probabilities and impacts is not exact science. Risk assessments in-
clude facts but also assumptions about the future events and regardless of our best efforts, 
we still do not for sure know what is going to happen in the future. This introduces uncertain-
ties and therefore also our exact measures to mitigate, control and eliminate risks are also 
often approximate.  
 
In order to understand how safety is created in the every day actions, we need to study also 
success and not only failures as in past accidents or near misses. If we want to understand 
where success originates from, we need to study success. As argued by Hollnagel (2014) 
mainly the accomplishment of everyday work by humans is a success and rarely a failure. Still 
our efforts to improve safety relies on studying past incidents, near misses and accidents. In 
complex systems that is not enough. Safety should also be improved with other methods. 
 
Tactical aspect of maritime safety 
 
Safety as a emergent and dynamic property of a system highlights the importance of the 
seafarer’s performance. In a safety critical situation, resources at hand are often limited, but 
the seafarers use their skills, knowledge and available resources to over come any shortages 
that might exist as accidents still are a rare event. This also sheds light on the tactical aspect 
of maritime safety. Safety is facilitated on a strategical level, but created on a tactical level. 
Strategical level defines business operation strategies, resourcing, technical solutions, legisla-
tion and needs for example training. On this level the general maritime traffic is coordinated 
such as Vessel Traffic Services and Traffic Separation Schemes, but this alone does not ensure 
safety. In spite of the best effort to monitor and coordinate the traffic, there are still groun-
dings and collisions at sea. In these situations it is still the skills and competence of the seafa-
rers that makes an action safe or unsafe. And the more complex the environment, e.g. Arctic 
shipping and navigating in ice, the more important will the tactical aspect be in creating and 
ensuring safety.  
 
Complex environment sets a bit different requirements for the human element than operating 
in a predictable environment, where safety can be ensured by compliance to rules, regulati-
ons and established ways of working. This will pose new challenges for leadership and at the 
  
same time also highlights the importance of leadership, so that even in ad hoc situations the 
crew can collectively manage the needed tasks according to overall goals and principles. 
 
The need for flexibility 
 
Complex and unpredictable situations makes it difficult to define in detail which course of ac-
tion to take in each situation. In order to efficiently respond to situational needs, question 
current ways of working for continuous improvement and make improvement suggestions 
some level of flexibility is needed along with decentralized decision making. Often those who 
make the work procedures are different from those who actually implement them and at ti-
mes, these do not meet. Studies show, that work-a-rounds exist also in the maritime world 
and it is not always about negligence but sometimes a necessary act to successfully accomp-
lish the task at hand with limited resources. Maritime safety has been quite far compliance to 
rules, regulations and established work procedures, but complexity requires a level of flexibi-
lity and decentralization of decision making to efficiently respond to ad hoc situations. Regu-
lations and work descriptions are simplified description of reality. If events occur, that fall 
outside the described ways of working and the written instructions do not sufficiently tell 
anymore which course of action to take, decisions need to be made and actions adjusted to 
the prevailing situational needs. In these situations two strict operational guidelines can even 
deteriorate safety. 
 
Those seafarers who are self-regulative, are empowered towards constant improvement of sa-
fety and operate within flexible rule making need also to have the skills and knowledge to 
operate within the area of flexibility. Their decision making needs to be directed towards the 
common objectives of the shipping company and general principles of sustainable shipping. 
They need to have mental core values that guide the operation as well as the right attitude 
towards safety. These are subject of leadership. Leadership is one of the key issues in comp-
lexity to ensure that the actions done are in line with the overall objectives and principles.  
 
Good Seamanship  
 
One of the core values within maritime domain is “Good Seamanship”. Seamanship has been 
recognized as a core value of seafarers for centuries. Good seamanship has no universal defi-
nition, but still it is widely used even in legislation to cover areas that can not be defined 
with written word. Studies also show, that seafarers perceive that their seamanship is not va-
lued and excessive needs for documentation, rules and regulation override their professio-
nalism. In a complex and unpredictable operational environment seamanship is something 
that can be used as a core value to direct action. Therefore, this thesis strongly emphasises 
  
the importance of Good Seamanship. The more compelex the environment, the more impor-
tant good seamanship becomes. Therefore, good seamanship should not be constrained by too 
strict rules and regulations. The organization should establish an climate where good sea-
manship is respected, developed and maintained as a part of a successful shipping.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Content 
 
1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 15 
1.1 Aim of the study ......................................................................... 16 
1.2 Structure of the study .................................................................. 16 
1.3 Limitations ............................................................................... 17 
2 General background and definitions ......................................................... 17 
2.1 What is safety? ........................................................................... 18 
2.2 Defining complex socio-technical systems .......................................... 19 
3 Changing safety thinking ....................................................................... 21 
3.1 Work-as-done and work-as-imagined ................................................. 23 
3.2 The driving forces of complexity ..................................................... 23 
3.3 The ETTO –principle ..................................................................... 24 
3.4 The element of uncertainty ........................................................... 26 
3.5 The reasoning behind Safety-II ........................................................ 27 
4 Research Design ................................................................................. 28 
4.1 The process of understanding – the methodology .................................. 29 
4.2 Data collection .......................................................................... 30 
4.3 The articles ............................................................................... 30 
5 Results from the articles ....................................................................... 32 
5.1 Arctic Maritime Safety – The Human Element seen from the Captain’s Table 32 
5.1.1. Discussions ........................................................................ 33 
5.2 Seamanship as a source of resilience ................................................ 35 
5.2.1 Discussion ......................................................................... 36 
5.3 Dynamic Aspect of Maritime Safety .................................................. 37 
5.3.1 Discussion ......................................................................... 38 
5.4 Suggestions for developing maritime safety ........................................ 38 
6 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 40 
 
References ............................................................................................... 77 
Tables ..................................................................................................... 83 
Appendix ................................................................................................. 84 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
The Theory  
 15 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction  
According to International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) around 90% of world trade is carried by 
the international shipping industry. There are over 60 000 merchant ships sailing internation-
ally transporting all kinds of cargo and are manned by over a million international seafarers 
from cross the globe. The way we know our world today would not be possible without ship-
ping and the industry is predicted to grow also in the future. (ICS; Grech, 2016, 2) Still ship-
ping is considered to be a high risk industry becoming more complex. Increasing automation, 
growing vessel size and specialization of vessels put pressure on the crew to acquire new 
skills and knowledge at the same time the traffic density is increasing. Economical pressure 
for productivity and cost reductions exists due to fierce competition within the industry. Fa-
tigue of seafarers raise concerns and the recent studies show that compliance in meeting the 
regulatory requirements of rest and work hours in general are poor. Minimization of crew size 
is used to seek economic efficiencies leaving fewer crew members to deal with more demand-
ing work conditions. Intensive shipping operations increases irregular and sometimes long 
working hours, interrupts sleeping hours and increases work load. Crews are often multicul-
tural where cultural and language barriers exist with possible social isolation. (Grech, 2016,1)  
 
Working at sea is also considered to be one of the most dangerous professions. Walters & Bai-
ley (2013, 1) write in their book about statistics where the: “… relative risk of mortality 
caused by accidents at work is 26 times greater than for all workers in the UK (Roberts and 
Marloe, 2005), while in the Danish merchant fleet the fatal accident rate was 11 times 
higher than for shore based industries…” Berg (2013, 344) again states maritime transport 
system to be: “…25 times riskier than the air transport system according to the accounts for 
deaths for every 100 km.” And through the intensification of sea trade in the future, also the 
potential risk to ship safety is increasing (Berg, 2013, 344). European Maritime Safety Agency, 
EMSA, published key figures of Marine casualties and accidents in 2014 (EMSA, 2015, 3). In to-
tal there were 3 399 ships involved in the accidents (including fishing vessels), 51 ships were 
lost, 1075 persons were injured and 136 fatalities. During the years of 2011-2014 there has 
been more than 390 persons who have lost their lives at sea and 3 250 have been injured. Also 
around 2/3 of total occurrences involved damage to the ship and the remaining 1/3 were ac-
cidents to persons on board. So regardless of the continuous safety improvement work and in-
creasing amount of rules and regulation, accidents still happen, lives are lost at sea and dam-
age to the environment occur.  
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1.1 Aim of the study 
Human error (errors made by the seafarers) as a cause of accidents at sea is counted to be 
around 80% (Berg, 2013, 344). At the same time the new safety thinking argues, that the hu-
man element is vital for successful operation due to their ability to adapt and adjust their 
performance according to situational needs. The concept of human error is stated to be too 
simplified reason for accidents and in order to improve safety, there is a need to look at 
safety from a more holistical point of view.  
 
Therefore the research questions are: 
1. What does it mean for safety management and leadership, that our systems are be-
coming increasingly complex making them intractable and unpredictable to various 
extents in their behavior.  
2. What is the role of human element in these complex systems in relation to maritime 
safety 
 
The aim of this study is to understand more deeply safety as a phenomena and the role of hu-
man as in seafarers in safe maritime transportation rather than search direct answers to the 
question how to eliminate human error. The aim is more to search new paths towards improv-
ing safety, to raise discussion rather than give only solutions. Safety is quite complex and ab-
stract phenomena as is the concept of human error. After all, to quote Alexander Pope: “To 
err is human”. 
1.2 Structure of the study 
This study is divided into two parts. The first part is the general introduction to the subject, 
with general presentation of the theoretical background and explanation of definitions used 
in the study (chapter 2). Chapter 3 is explaining the changing safety thinking and the guiding 
thought in this work has been Erik Hollnagel’s theories about Safety-II (Hollnagel, 2014). His 
argument about the need for human performance variability in complex systems to ensure 
safety and success has been the starting point and initial idea of this study. Therefore, these 
principles will follow throughout this work. Chapter 4 will explain the research design, the 
methods used and logic behind this study. Chapter 5 will introduce the articles and reveal the 
main findings. The part II are the actual articles.  
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1.3 Limitations 
Safety and human error are complex subjects and solutions how to eliminate human error in 
order to improve safety are not simple or straight forward. Therefore, this study does not 
give direct answers, but more as stated above, aims to find new paths towards improving 
safety. The focus of this thesis is also on seafarers as in human element living and working at 
sea faced with a complex and unpredictable situation or shipping in a high risk area like Arc-
tic and not focusing on shipping in a stable, well established routes where the seafarers are 
very familiar with the route, ship and navigational area. There are routines in shipping and 
standardized work procedures, which have been established due to experience, learning and 
predictability, but the aim of this study is to focus on situations when these do not apply. 
 
Today the development of autonomous ships is a hot topic. One of the arguments of digitali-
zation of knowledge, autonomous unmanned ships and for example enhanced monitoring of 
maritime traffic has the objective of improve safety by eliminating human error of seafarers 
(for further information, please see e.g MUNIN brochure, 3; AAWA Position Paper, 73; Bur-
meister et al., 2014, 5). However, there is also critique towards this kind of arguments. This 
critique state that even though autonomous shipping might reduce certain type of human er-
ror in the traditional sense (e.g. lack of vigilance and loosing situational awareness, errors 
due to fatigue), the new technological development both onboard the ship and in shore con-
trol room might create new types of errors (Hogg and Ghosh, 2016, 207). Even though un-
manned shipping is a hot topic, it is not in the scope of this study to take a stand whether au-
tonomous shipping will eliminate human error as such. The objective is to bring into light the 
strengths of human element and address the fact that the concept of human error is far more 
complex than simply state that autonomy of vessels will decrease human error. Thus also 
points out that there is a need to further research on things like competitive advantage of 
companies, which can be created through collective learning of employees and their exper-
tise to face safety critical, emergent ad hoc situations and successfully adjust their perfor-
mance for operational success.  
2 General background and definitions 
The objective in this chapter is to open up some of the definitions and principles covered in 
this thesis. These definitions are the basis for the articles reflecting the Safety-II and Resili-
ence Engineering principles into maritime domain. 
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2.1 What is safety? 
‘Safety’ is a common word, which we use in our everyday life in many different contexts and 
is quite recognizable to us. We say things like: “Drive safely” or ”Your secret is safe with 
me”. We all have an understanding of what is safe, but still safety does not have a single, uni-
versal definition. Reason (2000, 4; referring to The Concise Oxford Dictionary) gives the defi-
nition of safety as “freedom from danger and risks”, but later substitutes it with definition 
(Ibid, 5): “the ability of individuals or organisations to deal with risks and hazards so as to 
avoid damage or loss and yet still achieve their goals”. Hollnagel (2014, 2) gives also a more 
detailed generic definition: “Safety is the system property or quality that is necessary and 
sufficient to ensure that the number of events that could be harmful to workers, the public, 
or the environment is acceptably low.” Commenting the vagueness of definitions ‘harmful to 
workers’ and ‘acceptably low’ of their subjective nature. So what is meant by ‘being safe’ is 
generally that things will turn out the way they are expected to and whatever is being done is 
a success. In other words, it is things going right where safety is the absence of whatever 
could hinder us from achieving whatever we want to achieve. So in this sense, ‘safety is the 
freedom from unacceptable risk’. (Hollnagel, 2014, 3-5)  
 
This is not, however, the way we measure safety.  Safety is very commonly measured by how 
many accidents and incidents has happened, using these as the yard stick in determining 
whether something is safe or not. Therefore, safety management is focusing very much on 
what did not happen. Hollnagel (2014) uses the term dynamic non-event in his book. He is re-
ferring to Karl Weick, a professor who introduced the idea of reliability as a dynamic non-
event (Hollnagel, referring Karl Weick, 2014, 5): 
 
Reliability is dynamic in the sense that it is an ongoing condition in which problems are mo-
mentarily under control due to compensating changes in components. Reliability is invisible 
in at least two ways. First, people often don’t know how many mistakes they could have 
made but didn’t, which means they have at best only a crude idea of what produces reliabil-
ity and how reliable they are. […] Reliability is also invisible in the sense that reliable out-
comes are constant, which means there is nothing to pay attention to.  
 
The word dynamic in this context means that the outcome, the non-event, cannot be guaran-
teed in a way that we could be sure that nothing will happen. Therefore, safety is not a state 
that is once achieved and then left alone, but a condition of the system that needs constant 
monitoring and management. Due to the nature of safety as a dynamic non-event, we will al-
ways know how many accidents and incidents did happen, but how many accidents and inci-
dents did not happen (i.e. the non-events) due to different actions we took, is much more 
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difficult to measure if not impossible. Therefore, the traditional way of defining if something 
is safe or not, is to calculate how many accidents and incidents did happen. But, if the num-
ber will go down, say a company improves its processes and the accident rate goes down 50% 
and stays that way for a period of time. Can we really be sure, that an accident will not hap-
pen in the future? Safety as a concept is complex, as it is dynamic, nonlinear and a non-
event. Due to this dynamic complexity, it can also create safety paradoxes. 
2.2 Defining complex socio-technical systems 
A system consists of dynamically interacting components, which are interweaved together in 
such a way, that it maintains its structure. A system can be for example a human body, a so-
ciety, ecosystem, a city or a ship. It can exists on many levels and when studying a system, it 
needs to be seen as a whole. The individual elements cannot be studied in isolation, but in 
relation to its overall operational environment. (Rosnay 2011, 307) Like a ship as a system 
needs to be seen as a whole operating in its surroundings consisting of technological solutions, 
construction of the ship, engine, type of cargo it carries, the crew and their skills and 
knowledge, operational environment like route, sailing area, the regulatory framework, or-
ganizational factors, economical situation of the market, cultural and political factors etc.  
The number of elements that the system consists of and the nature of interaction between 
these elements define how complex the system is. A complex system functions in a nonlinear, 
dynamic way, which makes predicting the outcome of functioning unpredictable to different 
degree, depending on the system. (Ibid)  
 
Technology is playing an integral part of our today’s society and that is no different in ship-
ping. Automation and technological solutions in navigation, machinery, ballast and other ship 
operations is increasing at a rapid pace and unmanned ships are already being design to sail in 
the future (for further details see e.g. MUNIN). Still, no matter how automated a system is, 
humans are still a part of the functionality. All technological systems are seen in a socio-tech-
nical context, because these systems are designed by people for a purpose, hence to people 
for an intended use and user. They are built, tested and maintained by people as are their 
risk assessments, training and manuals done by people. So the human element is present in 
the technological system in one way or another. (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, 4) 
 
New technological solutions are usually introduced to for example reduce production cost 
(e.g. in shipping using automation to cut down crew size), improve product quality and safety 
(to eliminate human error due to fatigue and lack of vigilance), increased speed and effi-
ciency in production (faster ship unloading/loading and minimizing time in ports), mainte-
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nance (remote supervision and maintenance from remote land-based operators) etc. But in-
troducing new technological solutions, in spite of the business benefits does sometimes come 
with a cost. According to Hollnagel & Woods (2005, 4) as technology is put to use, the bene-
fits of it are not always certain. The benefits in one area can simply result problems in an-
other and leading the general system functionality towards further complexity. Hence, the 
inescapable side effect of improved efficiency or versatility is further system complexity, pos-
sible growing task and performance demands and unpredictability to some extent.  
 
Nicolis and Nicolis (2012, 4) state that nonlinearity is a necessary part of complexity meaning 
that different couplings within the system are not necessarily tractable. The fast pace of new 
technological innovations and solutions as well as their couplings and replacements in the old 
systems result in new unknowns emerging from our systems. Due to this there can be reduced 
ability to learn from past accidents as the possible paths to failure might not be valid any-
more nor are they as predictable as before. The rapid development of new technologies might 
also be shortening the time for testing, design and in general reduce learning and understand-
ing of the systems behavior as a whole. Hence, leaving also gaps in complete understanding of 
all possible risks and weaknesses of the system. (Levenson, 2012, 3-6) 
 
The complexity in our human-machine interfaces also introduce new human errors like mode 
confusion and over-reliance on automation. Inadequate communication between humans and 
machines introduces new types of errors. It is becoming increasingly important factor in acci-
dents and current approaches to safety engineering. (Levenson, 2012, 4) Skitka et al. (1999, 
992) points out similar issues stating that even the objective of introducing automation is to 
reduce human error, remarkably few studies have been made whether or not this is a fact. 
Skitka continues also, that there has been some evidence suggesting that the introduction of 
automated decision aids does not unilaterally lead to reduction in human error. It just intro-
duces different types of errors. 
 
Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (OIG) of United States of America 
issued a report stating similar concerns about over-reliance on automation of aircraft pilots, 
where several accidents have shown that pilot relying too much on automation can make er-
rors when confronted with an unexpected event or when switching over to manual mode of 
flying. They also questioned whether pilots receive enough training and experience to main-
tain their skills in manual flying. (OIG, 2016, 1) Therefore, this also indicates another possible 
safety paradox, where increasing automation in the cockpit to improve safety has actually re-
sulted in the decreasing ability of the pilots to actually fly a plane.  
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It is clear that automation enhances safety in general as stated also in the above mentioned 
report, but does not necessarily eliminate errors. It can create new types of errors. This does 
not undermine the importance of automation as means to develop better safety, but points 
out from a systemic point of view that the dynamic nature of complex system makes safety 
improvement a living, dynamic and continuous process. When improving safety in one area 
eliminates certain types of errors, new ones can emerge in another part of the system. These 
complex systems change with new technological innovations and solutions, training and skills 
of people, new legislation, operational environment etc. Complex systems are dynamically 
stable where instability emerges from simultaneously occurring functions and events in time 
and not only from an interconnection of components. (Hummerdal, Dahlström & Dekker, 
2007, 22)  
 
Therefore the same way the whole system of a ship can change when making changes in one 
area of the system. There are new rules and legislations introduced resulting in new processes 
and technological solutions to be added to existing structures and functions. Members of the 
crew change along with the cultural aspects, language and social relations. Varying weather 
conditions, routes and sailing areas change, and so does the possible economical pressure to-
wards production efficiency according to market situations, profitability needs of the com-
pany and so on. With these dynamical changes, so does the possible paths to failure. Hence, 
efforts to create safety is an ongoing process that requires constant monitoring, management, 
adjustment and adaptation. Safety is an emergent property of the system which is continu-
ously created again and again. And hence, failure also has the same emergent property of the 
same system. This way the path to success and failure has the same origin. Systemic perspec-
tive on safety sees that simply human error as the culprit of an accident is too simplistic. Hu-
man behavior cannot be separated from its context neither can focus be on one failing com-
ponent. According to systemic thinking of safety, in order to improve safety, we have to dig 
deeper to understand the motivation of certain human behavior within the systemic context. 
(Levenson, 2012, 5; Hummerdal, Dahlström & Dekker, 2007, 37)  
3 Changing safety thinking  
The traditional safety thinking has been focusing on identifying all possible risks and creating 
safety guards against them thinking that when safety guards for known risks are in place, op-
erations are considered safe. This way the objective is to reduce unpredictability in techno-
logical solutions as well as eliminate variability in human behavior by requiring that estab-
lished processes and best work practices are followed. This kind of thinking is restricting the 
behavior of humans in such a way that it is impossible to behave unsafely. (Hummerdal, Dahl-
ström & Dekker, 2007, 5) 
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Resilience and Safety-II thinking again is about giving room for well-trained and skilled em-
ployees to perform the job safely instead of making it impossible to complete the job un-
safely (Hummerdal et al. 2007, 2). This kind of thinking originates from the fact that in com-
plex socio-technical organizations focus should be on resilience due unpredictability and un-
certainty. In complex, safety critical industries it is not possible to reduce uncertainty to such 
a level that all possible paths to failure are known. Hence, resilience is about enhancing the 
capacity of people to work successfully, adapt and respond to challenges that occur outside 
the described and designed processes. The objective in resilience is to enhance the adaptive 
capacity of people and enable them to cope with uncertainty and vary their performance ac-
cording to situational needs to get the job done. Resilience is the capacity of handling and re-
covering from events which are emergent, unanticipated and surprising. (Hummerdal et. Al, 
2007, 2 – 5) 
 
As an example from the maritime world, according to the ICS (2013, 5) when analyzing serious 
accidents in shipping, it has been shown that the personnel involved are usually highly 
trained, competent and experienced, and the underlying cause of the accident was a failure 
to follow established procedures. To counter balance this statement, Seahorse Project is a 
consortium focusing on achieving safety enhancements in transport by achieving human orien-
tated resilient shipping environment. They are focusing on human factors in shipping safety 
and had their kick-off meeting in November 2013. (for further details, see www.seahorsepro-
ject.eu) In one of their workshops in Rotterdam, October 2015, Kurt et al. (2015, 14-17) pre-
sented research results regarding seafarers workarounds (Workaround defined as a changes to 
the procedures and equipment by the crew due to practical or other reasons). They sent 
questionnaires to 451 SEAHORSE Project partners crew and after data cleaning listed 110 
workarounds. In their questioners measuring attitude, the question: “related procedures re-
quired to be followed on ships are factually incorrect” got the answer “Often” 48% and 
“Sometimes” 24%. Same with the question: “Some procedures that crew need to follow as 
part of their job tasks make the job less efficient” received answers of “Often” 11%, “Some-
times” 35%, “Rarely” 20% and “Never” 4%. And the question: “In shipping companies, it is 
common that procedures are not always followed” got the answers “Often” 33%, “Some-
times” 37% and “Never” and “Always” both 5%.  
 
In this light, the seafarers who participated in this research seem to adjust their performance 
for some reason or another to get the job done. Surely part of the above can be things like 
laziness to cut corners, but it also could indicate a gap between what is actually happening on 
a ship and what has been written in the procedures. Hence, it raises the question that how 
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much do the seafarers globally use workarounds in shipping in order to get the job done due 
to deficiencies and shortages in the written work processes and “best practices”? 
3.1 Work-as-done and work-as-imagined  
Hollnagel (2014, 40 – 59) writes about the sharp end and the blunt end when looking at a work 
place regardless whether it is a hospital, supermarket or a government agency or in this the-
sis, a ship. Here the sharp end is the implementation level referring to the situation where 
the actual work is being carried out by people. Blunt end again are the ones, who do not di-
rectly participate in what is done by the sharp end, but still influence the people by e.g. 
management allocating resources and/or writing procedures, designer of used systems, policy 
makers and regulatory parties etc. The implementation of the actual work is done by the 
sharp end, called the ‘work-as-done’ and the blunt end mostly focus on how work should be 
done, called the ‘work-as-imagined”. The blunt end is giving some general assumptions how 
the work should be carried out, what working conditions should be like and basically looking 
at the implementation of work from the outside and from a distance. 
 
In the traditional way of thinking about human element and human error, humans are seen as 
a component of a system equal to machines, which are meant to work in a certain, prede-
signed way called the work-as-imagined. As machines, humans either work as stated in the 
work-as-imagined or fail to follow procedures. Now, usually the people who actually do the 
work (work-as-done) are different from those who write the work procedures (work-as-imag-
ined). The more complex the operational environment is, the harder it will be to describe 
these work procedures and anticipate all possible conditions that might exist. Therefore, 
most likely people who actually do the work face situations where work cannot be carried out 
like work-as-imagined. And, when variation is between the work procedures and reality, if 
things go wrong, it is easily assumed that the reason for accidents is because work procedures 
were not followed. (Hollnagel, 2014, 44-46) Like Hollnagel says (2014, 44): “This is due to ex 
post facto reasoning, which says that if only person X had done Y´ instead of Y, then the out-
come would have been different.” This way of thinking does not exclude creating best prac-
tices and writing work procedures, but questions the fact it suits perfectly for all environ-
ments, especially the complex ones. Hence, it can be argued that safety cannot only be im-
proved by solely following procedures.  
3.2 The driving forces of complexity 
Our systems are becoming more and more complex, hence more difficult to describe and in-
tellectually manage (Levenson, 2011, 4-6; Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, Chapter 1). The driving 
forces for this complexity (Levenson, 2011, 4-6; Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, Chapter 1) are the 
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fast pace of technological change, digitalization and computerization resulting in growing 
complexity of socio-technical systems changing the way we work and creating new fields of 
activity. Along with automation humans are increasingly sharing control with automation 
and/or moving to higher positions of decision making leaving the automation to implement 
the decisions. Increased complexity in couplings between different systems and the fast pace 
of technological change reduces the time of the users learning curve and increases the com-
plexity of tasks and performance demands. These changes also introduced new paths to fail-
ure and new types of hazards. As the technological improvements are often driven by the 
need for further business gains like efficiency and profitability, the new technological solu-
tions also have decreased the tolerance towards single accidents due to the scale of our sys-
tems and the impact of their failure to harm increasing number of people or economical loss.  
 
As an example from shipping in the growing of size of vessels are one of the world’s biggest 
cruise ship, Harmony of the Seas, that can carry nearly 6 000 passengers and 2 000 crew 
members or one of the world’s largest cargo ships Emma Maersk that carry 12 000 containers, 
cargo that is worth half a billion dollars.  
 
At the same time as companies are dealing with the increasing potential losses of one single 
accident they are coping with an aggressive and competitive environment where cost and 
productivity play an important role in decision making. This is resulting in the difficulty of se-
lecting priorities between trade-offs that Hollnagel (2009) is describing as the Efficiency-
Thoroughness Trade-Off, the ETTO –principle. 
3.3 The ETTO –principle 
Hollnagel (2009, 19) defines ETTO –principle at its simplest as follows: “If demand for produc-
tivity or performance are high, thoroughness is reduced until the productivity goals are met. 
If demands for safety are high, efficiency is reduced until the safety goals are met.” People 
make these decisions often, but the question is how to balance between being efficient and 
being thorough?  
 
The definition of Efficiency is about resources and how much are used in order to achieve a 
goal. These resources can be time, money, materials, workload etc. with the objective to 
keep the amount of resources used as low as possible. The criteria which is the appropriate 
level of used resources can come from external demands or requirements or individually from 
habits, social norms or established practices. Thoroughness again is about making sure that 
the activity to be taken, and the prevailing conditions, are such that the achievement of the 
goal will be met without any unwanted side-effects. It is to ensure that the needed resources 
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are in place e.g. enough time, tools at hand, needed money/funding ensured, manpower suf-
ficient and the performance is monitored and controlled in order to verify that the outcome is 
as intended. (Hollnagel, 2009, 16). Sometimes these goals between thoroughness, as in 
safety, and efficiency, as in production efficiency, is seen as conflicting ones. These two con-
flicting goals are a primary concern for any organization. Then again, considering an organiza-
tion being just one and not the other, i.e. being only thorough or only efficient, will not most 
likely be successful in the long run. Therefore, successfully balancing between safety and pro-
duction efficiency is crucial for organizational success. In complex systems, there is no single 
solution how to balance successfully between safety and production efficiency. It is an inte-
gral part of continuous decision making. (Hummerdal et. Al, 2007, 4-6) 
 
Connected to this problem is the gap between work-as-done and work-as-imagined. The work-
ers at the sharp end often have to make trade-offs to meet both the safety goals and the pro-
duction goals. As an example of this is to do something fast due to time pressure (being effi-
cient), but at the same time safely according to procedures (being thorough). Therefore, if 
both goals cannot be met (e.g. due to time pressure in a safety-critical situation), the opera-
tor at the sharp end needs to make a balancing decision i.e. adapting to the prevailing condi-
tions in order to successfully accomplish the work task. Therefore, in order for an organiza-
tion to be resilient, the workers at the sharp-end, sometimes have to move away from being 
reliable (as in strictly following procedures) in order to be both efficient and safe. 
(Hummerdal et al. 2007, 4-6; Hollnagel, 2009, 27-30). Therefore, quoting Hummerdal et. Al, 
(2007, 4):  
 
“In advanced socio-technical organizations, with high competency demands on employees, 
safety leadership is more about providing the room to perform a job safely than about mak-
ing it impossible to do the job unsafely. To assume that people will do things wrong if they 
are not told exactly how to do things, is not the point. The assumption should rather be that 
people will do things safely unless the conditions for this are unfavorable.” 
 
One of the objectives of safety improvement is to close the gap between what is done in real-
ity at the sharp end and what is imagined at the blunt end.  It is also necessary to understand 
that some degree of variability, flexibility and adaptability is needed for the system to work. 
Performance adjustments and performance variability is needed to ensure successful opera-
tion of the system, thus constraining it will inevitably affect flexibility to react and adapt to 
situations, and therefore also constraining is affecting the ability to achieve desired targets. 
Constraining performance can be done in many ways e.g. strict training, rules, regulations, 
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guidelines, supervision, standardization and other barriers of various kinds. Successful out-
comes are the result of the ability of people to adjust their work to prevailing conditions and 
to react also to what others do. These adjustments are becoming more and more important as 
the system grows more complex. (Hollnagel & Leonhardt, 2013, 14) 
 
The need for adaptability, flexibility and variability of performance does not exclude compli-
ance to rules and regulations, but is more about giving room to react to emerging situations 
which fall outside the written procedures. As Kotter (2001, 103-104)  points out that manage-
ment i.e. rules and procedures, best practices and compliance is about control, order and 
consistency which is preventing the organization from becoming chaotic and disoriented in 
such a way that would threaten its existence. In the same way legislation protects humans, 
property and the environment in shipping as does established best practices enhance safety 
e.g. regarding crew living conditions, safety rounds, entering closed spaces or eliminating oil 
spills in the sea by ships. Shipping needs international rules, regulation and control. But, in 
order to cope with uncertainty, a certain level of flexibility is needed to correctly respond to 
sudden, unexpected ad hoc situations (Grote, 2015, 72-73; Knudsen, 2009, 302).   
3.4 The element of uncertainty 
Complex systems are not linear cause-effect systems, therefore cannot be taken apart into 
individual components to understand its functioning. Complex systems consist of both tracta-
ble and intractable, interweaved couplings where the safety and failure are more of an emer-
gent nature. Due to this, we need to accept that there will be parts of its functionality which 
are both unknown and unpredictable in nature. (Uncertainty being basically ‘not knowing for 
sure’ what is going to happen, when and how, therefore decisions are made knowingly based 
on incomplete set of facts.) Therefore writing detailed work instructions about how work 
should be done will be difficult, if not impossible. (Hanén and Huhtinen 2013, 9-11; Hollnagel, 
2014) 
 
When all possible situations cannot be anticipated and the linear cause-effect relationships 
are no longer necessary valid, the challenge of increasing safety is related to the ability to 
cope with uncertainty (Hummerdal et al., 2007, 37). In complex systems it cannot be assumed 
that failure is resulting only from malfunctioning components, bad behavior or failure to fol-
low procedures. Performance variability is not only normal and necessary, but also indispen-
sable. Humans on every level of the organization in one point of another needs to adjust their 
ways of working to meet the needs of existing conditions regarding resources, requirements, 
tools at hand, manpower, time constraints etc. And because most of the time these resources 
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are often limited also the adjustments are approximate rather than perfect. Usually these ad-
justments, regardless of the limitation of resources, enable the work to be completed suc-
cessfully by humans.  Therefore, the way work most of the time goes right and very rarely 
goes wrong originates from the same source. The need for performance variability. And that 
is why performance variability should not be interpreted negatively as ‘performance devia-
tions’, ‘violations’ and ‘non-compliance’. (Hollnagel, 2014, 120-122)  
 
In the traditional safety and risk management thinking, risk has been seen in decision making 
something that should be avoided, eliminated, reduced to acceptable level or transferred to 
external parties like for example insurance companies. And as “Uncertainty is at the heart of 
risk” (Grote, 2015, 71) so has the objective been the same for uncertainty. As the traditional 
approaches to safety has been focusing on reliability, focus has been to reduce unpredictabil-
ity in technological functioning as well as in human behavior (Hummerdal et al., 2007, 5) Un-
certainty is often perceived as a negative thing, but Grote (2015, 71-72) argues, that safety 
can be promoted by increasing uncertainty. Reason (2000, 3-4) argues also, that the line, the 
“edge” between the relative safety and unacceptable danger is the zone of greatest peril and 
greatest profit. It is as in ETTO –principle, the skill to balance between safety and profit. 
3.5 The reasoning behind Safety-II 
Safety-II is the ability to succeed under expected and unexpected conditions. The principles 
of Safety-II are based on resilience engineering, where resilience has been defined as: “The 
intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes 
and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unex-
pected conditions.” (Leonhardt et al., 2009, 2; Hollnagel, 2014, 134)  
 
Traditional way of safety thinking, predicting risks and their probabilities are still valid to 
some extent depending on the complexity of the system. Some accidents and incidents do 
happen due to linear cause-effect model, but some do not. In complex systems, accidents can 
happen without a component failing, without mistakes or human error, with operations ac-
cording to design and well maintained. These disruptions are emergent. Emergent outcomes 
arise from unexpected and unintended combination of performance. The emergent outcome 
just existed in one point of time and left without any trace. Therefore, the outcomes cannot 
be traced back to specific component or function neither are they necessarily proportional to 
the input i.e. the output is not proportional to the input e.g. the butterfly effect. (Hollnagel, 
2014, 132) 
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Hollnagel et al. (2013, 6) discuss the difference in focusing on things that go right and things 
that go wrong as an example between the difference between Safety-I and Safety-II thinking. 
Safety –I thinking is based on the absence of unwanted outcomes like incidents and accidents 
defining safety as: “The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property dam-
age is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing pro-
cess of hazard identification and safety risk management.” 
 
The development has been in general focusing on accidents and incidents, finding the root 
cause and building safety guards against them in order to ensure they do not happen again. 
The other one has been to identify risks, making risk assessments, predicting risk probabilities 
and their impacts in order to avoid, reduce, retain or transfer risks and uncertainties by 
building different barriers. According to Safety-I things go wrong usually due to technical fail-
ures or malfunctions, human error or misbehavior and/or due to different organizational fac-
tors. The purpose of accident investigation is to find the root cause and contributory factors, 
while the risk assessments aim to predict the likelihood and impact of risk. As an example, is 
to consider a task that is performed 10 000 times. This performance usually goes right 9 999 
times, but fails one time. The focus on finding why this happened is on the one very rare oc-
casion. This one occasion is investigated, the work performance is assessed and reviewed and 
finally as root cause is found for the accidents, safety barriers and possibly new regulations 
and guidelines are put in place. But this analysis of that one time does not tell us why the 9 
999 times have been a success. Therefore, in order to improve safety, we need to focus on 
both sides of story. We need to understand both why things succeed and why they fail. 
(Hollnagel et al., 2013, 6) 
4 Research Design 
This chapter describes the design of this study, data collection process and logic of under-
standing to analyze this collected data. This study and the outcome is not built as a linear 
process, but more like a continuous spiral, that starts from a preliminary idea or an opinion of 
the subject and starts to evolve towards deeper understanding of the whole with literature 
research and reflections into the maritime world. These reflections have been articles with 
the aim to understand deeper a particular subject, a real life issue of the maritime world like 
e.g Arctic shipping or a chemical accident in a ship.  
 
One motif runs through all of the papers, the seafarer and the role of human element in ship-
ping with the elements of complexity and uncertainty present. The end result of this study 
has been constructed from different parts of the articles presenting not the absolute truth 
but an interpretation of the studied literature and experience, both to understand theories 
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and reflect them into maritime examples. Examples of real life has been used to illustrate the 
research questions and to bind the theories from literature into shipping on a practical level.  
 
To make a synthesis of it all and to bind these articles into the whole, abductive reasoning 
has been used as the logic of understanding. The reason to base the research mainly on litera-
ture review, theories and hypothesis that are reflected to the maritime world via examples. 
As the subject is about understanding a phenomena of safety, interviews and questioners was 
not seen as a way to uncover the essence of safety, where it originates from and how it is 
created. The same was to understand complexity. These are quite abstract concepts, which 
can be understood in many different ways by people. In order to study a phenomena of com-
plexity and safety, literature review and analysis simply seemed to be the best option to gain 
deeper understanding.  
 
The logic to interpret the collected material has been abductive reasoning. Abductive reason-
ing studies the given data and comes to a hypothesis about the given facts. Abductive reason-
ing is also called “best explanation” (Walton, 2005, xiii). The process starts with a basic idea 
or understanding of the subject, but this can change along the way. It can be abstract or even 
intuitive thought that guides the work. Collecting material can be loosely connected, even 
though logical, in the beginning. Notes can be separate occasions, still connected to the guid-
ing thought and at some point things start to intertwine together. (Virtuaali Ammattikor-
keakoulu)  
 
4.1 The process of understanding – the methodology 
The process of understanding started of with the basic idea and a research question of the 
subject. In the beginning it was simply: “How can we lead and manage safety if we do not 
know the risks?”. The theory base for the starting point was Erik Hollnagel’s Safety-II thinking 
(Hollnagel, 2014). Hollnagel (2014) argue a hypothesis, that the ability of humans to adapt 
and adjust their performance to occurring needs is vital to ensure safety and operational suc-
cess. There are no perfect systems nor is there rarely situations, when people need to accom-
plish their work tasks, they would have all needed resources available. Often resources like 
time, tools, information, manpower etc. are incomplete and human compensate to these 
shortages by adapting to the situation and use resources available to get the job done. This 
idea was reflected in the first article into Arctic Shipping to gain deeper understanding of the 
role of human element in an complex, high risk environment. 
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4.2 Data collection 
 
Data collection has been mainly literature forming the theoretical base line which are re-
flected to real life subjects like Arctic Shipping and seamanship. The literature search started 
with Erik Hollnagel, his books and articles about the principles of Safety-II and Resilience En-
gineering. Scientifical databases were searched with words like Maritime Safety, Human Ele-
ment, Maritime and complexity, unpredictability, safety and leadership. Some of the included 
articles were as references in another article used and guided forward to research a particu-
lar subject. The articles also included words specific to their topic like Arctic shipping and 
safety, Arctic shipping and human element, risk assessments and unpredictability, seamanship 
and dynamic risk assessments. To bind the theories to practical examples of real life, differ-
ent maritime reports were used and maritime related books like books about seamanship, ice 
navigation or Polar Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Total data collection 
 
4.3 The articles 
 
The first article was a literature review and a conference paper. It studied the Arctic shipping 
in the light of Safety-II principles and as such, was the beginning of this research process. The 
literature review consisted of peer reviewed scientific articles, books, maritime journals and 
white papers and official web –pages like IMO. 
 
Literature type  
Peer reviewed scientific articles 32 
Maritime Journals and White Papers 10 
Books 19 
Dissertions 2 
Others e.g. IMO web -pages 18 
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Table 2. Literature used for the article 1. 
 
The second article was again part of WINMOS II project, that studies the tacit knowledge of 
professional ice breakers with the objective to preserve the high level of skills and knowledge 
of Finnish and Swedish Ice Breaking profession. In the near future a big amount of profes-
sional ice breakers will retire and the risk is that a lot of valuable knowhow will be lost (WIN-
MOS). This article is also leaning on the Hollnagel’s (2014) Safety-II principles reflecting the 
idea that we cannot only develop safety through hindsight or predictions of the future, but 
more to study and understand why things go right as well as why things go wrong. Therefore, 
this article reflects these safety development principles into understanding tacit knowledge 
as professionalism which is to understand how things go right. The article was done as a liter-
ature review. It formed also theoretical background for further research within the project. 
 
Literature type Amount 
Peer reviewed scientific articles 12 
Maritime Journals and White Papers 4 
Books 6 
Others e.g. IMO web -pages 4 
   
  Table 3. Literature used for the article 2. 
 
The third article is an essay discussing risk assessment as a way to improve safety and intro-
duces a method called Dynamic Risk Assessment. The systematic methods and tools to address 
and support decision making in a dynamic, safety critical situation are limited in the maritime 
world. During the writing of this thesis and working with the maritime project, especially 
ChemSAR (ChemSAR) dealing with chemical accidents at sea, one comes across often with in-
structions to assess the risks in a particular situation. But, what actually is lacking, is the How 
to assess the risks in a dynamic situation. The essay discusses the need for new tools and 
methods for safety development in a unpredictable and dynamic situation. It brings together 
the results and argues for the tactical aspect of maritime safety highlighting the need for new 
methods and tools to ensure safety.  
Literature type Amount 
Peer reviewed scientific articles 12 
Maritime Journals and White Papers 4 
Books 5 
Others e.g. IMO web -pages 4 
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       Table 4. Literature used for article 3. 
5  Results from the articles 
This chapter will discuss the research results from different articles where the above men-
tioned issues are reflected into shipping. The main idea in them all is complexity, uncertainty 
and unpredictability and how to cope with these elements present. The first article is about 
Arctic shipping, the second about Seamanship as a source of resilience and the third about 
risk management in an emergent situation. 
 
5.1 Arctic Maritime Safety – The Human Element seen from the Captain’s Table 
The global climate change has opened up new routes in the Arctic. The attractiveness of the 
new routes derives from economical gain by cutting down the distance between the Pacific 
and Atlantic oceans. But, navigating in the Arctic is not without risks. The extreme climate of 
low temperatures, sudden storms and icy conditions as well as shortages in the navigational 
aids pose challenges for the Arctic making it a complex and high-risk area to navigate. One 
simple mistake can escalate fast into a safety-critical problem and help is possibly very far 
away.  
 
At the same time, as the Arctic routes are new, there is not much experience of navigating 
these areas amongst global mariners, therefore navigating in the Arctic will include uncer-
tainties to different levels. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recognizes the need 
for further training for seafarers and therefore requires that all ships operating in the polar 
ice-covered waters should carry at least one Ice Navigator. (IMO 2010) However, this paper 
argues, that more is needed than just theoretical knowhow and compliance to the Polar 
Code. 
 
For safe, sustainable and profitable shipping in the Arctic, the attention needs to be paid to 
human resources, because with the uncertainties present, the crew will most likely end up 
facing emergent ad hoc situations, that fall beyond the written procedures and face risks 
which could not be anticipated. The high performance of the ship is the high performance of 
Literature type Amount 
Peer reviewed scientific articles 12 
Books 7 
Others web –pages, white papers, reports 4 
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its crew, and the whole crew as one, not the action of separate individuals. This will highlight 
the team unity and collective performance as a critical success factor. Working for the team 
unity, their trust in each other and empowerment towards constant improvement will en-
hance team performance. The crew needs also to believe, that what they do and say matters 
and is valued, therefore psychological safety to promote speaking up and appropriate commu-
nication within the team is essential. This puts the Captain of the ship, as a leader of the 
crew, in a key position. The hard and soft skills of the Captain, the abilities to lead, moti-
vate, inspire and empower the crew are vital for safe and sustainable shipping in the Arctic. 
 
High performing crew needs a level of flexibility to cope with uncertainties and occurring ad 
hoc situations. Flexible rules are a strategic safety and risk management question of the ship-
ping company, but also a question for the legislative authorities. It is also about training, be-
cause once the crew is put in a position with flexible regulatory framework, it should be en-
sured that the persons are capable of taking advantage of the flexibility and not get disori-
ented or misuse the given freedom. And as the crew, their skills and knowledge develop and 
accumulates within the shipping company, the management should ensure that these skills 
stay with within the ship and the company. This will enable the ship to develop as an organi-
zation, learn from experience and constantly improve its performance towards safer Arctic 
shipping. This will be a question of leadership and management, because the execution of 
safety measures lie within the seafarers and Captains working at sea. It is about the people 
living and working in the ship, facing sea originates risks on daily bases, using their skills and 
knowledge to adapt to situational need, compensating for shortages in resources to get the 
job done and in the end fight for their survival in case of an accident.  
5.1.1. Discussions 
Shipping in the Arctic represents quite well the ideas of Safety-II by Hollnagel (2014), because 
the passageways are new, which means that there is not much experience amongst seafarers 
about navigation in the area. There are shipping companies who successfully sail in the Arctic 
area (for further see e.g. Fednav, Arctic Oy, Hurtigruten), but if the Arctic routes open up in 
such a way, that the Arctic routes are attracting to many shipping companies, the is a high 
risk that unexperienced seafarers will be navigating the high risk areas of the Arctic. This will 
mean, that these unexperienced seafarers are subject to uncertainty and unpredictability. 
They will not know exactly what lays ahead, even they have studied it according to the Polar 
Code course. Therefore, it will come down to the abilities of these seafarers to respond to 
emerging situations as they appear. Not all will be safety critical, but surely some will. High-
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risk areas with harsh weather conditions like the Arctic does not give a lot of room for mis-
takes. Therefore, what ever is being done, should be done right the first time. There will not 
be much room for trial and error or experimenting.  
 
This indicates that safety has two dimensions, strategic and tactical dimension. Strategical 
dimension is about the strategical safety framework done before entering the Arctic shipping 
passages. This strategical framework can also be called the Safety Management System, that 
is nothing new in the Maritime domain. It is about strategical decisions made on the company 
management level, complying to international and national legislations, ship construction de-
cisions, decisions about recruiting and training, risk assessments done before entering the 
Arctic passages etc. It is about creating a safety framework for the ship and its crew to enter 
the Arctic. But, when the ship and its crew are in the Arctic and something happens, it will 
become a question of tactical decision making on the spot. This is the dimension of tactical 
safety. It is about navigating the way between icebergs, at which point to reduce or increase 
speed in ice, how to respond to engine failures or to failure of navigational instruments etc. 
 
These decisions can be addressed in beforehand on theoretical basis, but the true decision 
making will be done as the situation occurs. In order to improve safety, both of the dimen-
sions have to be addressed appropriately. The emphasis has been on strategical safety, such 
as increasing legislations, increasing external monitoring (e.g. Vessel Traffic Cervices), in-
creasing automation to reduce human error etc. This thesis argues, that the tactical dimen-
sion is at least as essential as the strategical dimension and will even be highlighted with the 
increased complexity, unpredictability and uncertainty. This is because at some point it might 
be, that the rules do not apply, best practices fall short and the seafarer is in an ad hoc situa-
tion required to make a decision about a situation where s/he has never been in before. The 
time is running out fast and risks are high. A decision has to be made whether to follow writ-
ten procedures or does the situation require the decision maker to ignore them and innovate 
something new. This is a skill that training should focus on. How do we teach seafarers to 
make a correct decision about when to follow rules and when to discard them?  
 
Hanén and Huhtinen (2011, 13) state that due to the interweaved interconnections within our 
systems, our reality is situationally bound. This makes safety bound also to the decisions 
made and actions taken in each situation in a certain space and time. Safety needs to be 
weaved into our actions, decisions and thinking, because safety dynamically recreates itself 
in the everyday work at the sharp end that is enabled and controlled by the overall strategi-
cal safety framework done by the blunt end.  
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To describe in beforehand, when to comply to rules, when to bend them and when to ignore 
them, is not necessarily an easy task. Neither is teaching adaptability, innovative problem 
solving and tactical decision making under high pressure or coming up with new ways to gain 
experience without actually gaining it in real life through working. Safety-II thinking and to 
cope with complexity and uncertainty will also raise questions about whether there should be 
some new, innovative ways to teach and learn skills needed to cope with situations that can 
not be predicted. This could be an area for further research in order to improve safety of 
shipping. 
5.2 Seamanship as a source of resilience 
The previous article expressed the need for more flexible rulemaking in relation to complex-
ity and unpredictability and highlights the fact that it is important to ensure also, that the 
people who are required to work within more flexible legislative framework also know how to 
take advantage of it to ensure successful completion of work tasks. This paper takes a deeper 
look into this more flexible area by addressing the issue of how to ensure that when compli-
ance does not give direction to decision making, how to ensure that the decisions made are 
correct ones.  
 
Seamanship is a common expression, but it does not have any universal, specific definition. It 
is like the expression “good manners”. Most likely most of us will know, what are good and 
bad manners, but to really specify them is much harder. In general, seamanship is about be-
ing able to maneuver the ship and take care of it. It is the crew’s professional and practical 
skills which are needed to get the job done well at sea. (Borg and Åkerblom 2012, 4-5) Knud-
sen (2009, 295) defines seamanship as a: “blend of professional knowledge, professional 
pride, and experience-based common sense.” The definition of good seamanship is much 
more than just practical skills or what can be learned at school. It is about experience gained 
by working at sea, abilities to work independently and safely according to ones own judge-
ment, intuition and adaptation to situational needs. Good seamanship also covers the short-
ages in legislation like COLREGS, which do not contain answers to all possible encounters 
(Suppiah, 2007, 19). Hence, good seamanship does include the compliance to legislation, but 
also, within fact based good reasoning, deviation from rules are accepted when referring to 
Good Seamanship (Ibid, iv-v). 
 
Hollnagel et al. (2013, 6) give the example of a work task which is accomplished 10 000 
times. 9 999 times this work task will be a success, but for one time it fails. All the effort will 
be put on the one failure leaving the 9 999 times uninvestigated. This resulting in the in-
crease of knowledge about what went wrong, but leaves a big gap in understanding about 
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what actually makes the accomplishment of the work task a success. Hindsight of past acci-
dents and their causes tell only what went wrong, but does not tell where safety originates 
from or why accomplishing a work task most of the time succeeds. Therefore, in order for us 
to truly understand where safety originates from, we should concentrate also to understand 
these 9 999 times of success.  
 
Hummerdal et al. (2007 2-5; 12-13) also state by providing employees a framework that al-
lows them to do their work safely is much more efficient than constraining behavior to ensure 
that employees do not do their work unsafely. People usually do their job well and safely 
when given the room and opportunity. As safety is a dynamic and emergent property of our 
systems and is constantly created again, success depends on flexible, adaptive, empowered 
and proactive people actively anticipating different paths to failure and adapting to emerging 
situational needs to get the job done (Hollnagel, 2014, 119). In complex and safety critical 
problems however, expertise and experience is highlighted. As safety and risk management is 
fundamentally about decision making, often with the element of uncertainty present, exper-
tise enables to make sense of, and develop solutions quickly by recognizing key information in 
a certain situation. (Mauelshagen et al., 2013, 1187)  
 
Some studies show, that there is a lack of respect towards seamanship of professional, experi-
enced seafarers. They however, are a valuable asset to companies especially from the resili-
ence and Safety-II point of view. The more complex and dynamic the situation, the more will 
the safety be dependent on professional seafarers and their expertise. In order for a company 
to fully utilize the expertise of their employees, they should firstly express respect by decen-
tralizing decision making to enhance communication and closing the gap between reality and 
assumed reality. Secondly, for an organization to actually understand where success and 
safety originates from, they should concentrate on studying why things go right instead of 
concentrating only why things go wrong. To understand success, one have to study success. 
But, success is often hidden in the minds of the experts as tacit knowledge. Therefore, using 
the definition of Knudsen (2009, 295) about seamanship being about professionalism of sea-
farers and the fact from studies, that professional seafarers do use workarounds i.e. adapt 
and adjust their performance to get the job done, which usually is a success. Hence, they are 
the source of resilience.  
5.2.1 Discussion 
This paper showed too that there is a lack of respect towards professional seafarers and their 
seamanship or at least it is perceived that way. Seafarers do deviate from rules and regula-
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tions, which shows a gap between the work-as-done and work-as-imagined, but to really un-
derstand the reason why, further studies should be conducted. Statistics still show, that the 
accomplishment of their tasks is usually a success. At the same time, complexity creates un-
certainties that are difficult to address from risk management point of view. We cannot antic-
ipate all possible paths to failure and hence, we will not be able to create safety guards 
against them in a way that we can ensure safety. Resilience is the ability to cope with uncer-
tainty, to regain balance if balance is lost, create innovative solutions to sudden failures and 
ensure that the operation of a ship continue regardless of some disturbances. Within flexible 
rules, Good Seamanship is a code, a set of core values that guides the professional seafarers 
even though it cannot be specified in detail. Good Seamanship can be used, when written 
rules do not cover every possible situation and still ensure, that the decision within flexible 
framework are done according to the greater good. 
 
Disrespect towards professional seafarers and their seamanship deteriorates their respect to-
wards their own work and motivation. If they feel that their experience and work input is not 
valued, it could affect safety in a negative way. If they need to find workarounds to compen-
sate for shortages in processes and resources to get the work done, and still do it success-
fully, they are a source for safety development. It might be, that the professional seafarers 
really do know how to make the work better, faster and safer only no-one has really taken 
the time to ask them about it.   
5.3 Dynamic Aspect of Maritime Safety 
This paper discusses a risk assessment method called the Dynamic Risk Assessment. It was de-
veloped by UK Fire Service as a result of several firefighter fatalities. It is a mental method to 
assess risk in a dynamic environment, where the operational environment is dynamic, rather 
than the actual risk itself. Traditional predictive risk assessments are too time consuming for 
a dynamic situation and due to complexity, they might not cover all possible situations. 
Therefore, the DRA is a method to support decision making in an environment that is fast 
paced and changing. It is about assessing the situation when the written procedures and best 
practices might not be applicable, and performance adjustments are needed to ensure safety 
in a dynamic situation.  
 
The main findings of this paper was that the tactical (when the situations is already at hand) 
aspect of risk assessment is not really addressed in the maritime world. Risk assessments are 
generally predictive, done in before hand on a strategical or operational level but fail to ad-
dress the need for systematic risk assessment in ad hoc situation on the tactical level. There 
is a need for further research to understand tactical safety and what kind of methods and 
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tools could support decision making in a dynamic situation. Compliance to rules and best 
practices is emphasized in the maritime world, but the resent study indicates that in order to 
cope with uncertainties, this might not be enough. In order to enhance safety, the people 
need to know how to operate within flexibility and make decisions, which are in line with 
core safety values of the company and the whole operational system.  
5.3.1 Discussion 
To ensure safety correct decisions at a certain time and space are required, but there might 
be more solutions to a problem and paths to ensure safety than just one. Sometimes what is 
described as a failure to follow procedures might just be a necessary “work-a-round” to make 
the job more safely in a unforeseen situation as pointed out by Okoli et al. (2016). Several au-
thors () also pointed out that uncertainties need to be included in risk assessments. If these 
uncertainties need flexible rules, decentralized decision making and performance adjust-
ments, then there might be a need to address these issues in training and educational sectors. 
This will most likely have an effect also on leadership, because in the area of uncertainty 
safety needs to be lead and managed in other ways than compliance to rules. Whether or not 
current maritime education sufficiently addresses these issues needs more research.  
 
5.4 Suggestions for developing maritime safety 
This section draws together the research results into suggestions for safety development for 
shipping companies.  
 
Also the appendix 1 and 2 are real life cases in ongoing projects and research. WINMOS II pro-
ject has the aim of studying the tacit knowledge of experienced icebreaker officers to pre-
serve valuable knowhow and skills in the profession, which can be related to the point 2 be-
low. Understanding where success originates from is as essential as understanding incidents 
and near misses. One way to do this is to study skilled employees performing daily tasks. The 
other is ChemSAR project, where workshops to enhance and train decision making and test 
operational procedures have been done by decision games. In a chemical accident, it is most 
likely certain, that available information will be limited as will time be. Still decisions need 
to be made and actions started. The same is in the Arctic. Complex and high risk environ-
ment, harsh weather conditions and unpredictability will call for rapid decision making with 
limited amount of resources. Even though we can not predict all risks, we can train to make 
decisions and take action with the resources that are available. 
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1) Closing the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done to understand how 
the work actually is done in real life context. This also relates to workarounds. If em-
ployees need work-arounds to get the job done due to for example shortages in re-
sources or inaccuracies in work procedures, reasoning behind their decision making 
should be understood which can point towards safety development areas. This will en-
sure also that both the shore based personnel and crew onboard have the same view 
about work performance.  
 
2) Hollnagel (2014) and Safety-II thinking emphasises also that it is important to unders-
tand why things go right as well as wrong. Maritime domain focus a lot on studying 
past accidents, incidents and near-misses, which naturally is important for safety im-
provment, but understanding failures does not give sufficient answer to where safety 
originates from.  If the company does not have an understanding also where safety 
and success originates from, this could be an area for further safety development. 
Collective learning of employees and their expertise are often hidden as tacit know-
ledge in the minds of the professional seafarers. If a vessel sails in complex navigati-
onal areas, keeps its timetable and/or successfully transports goods from year to 
hear, it might be that there is hidden knowledge which could be shared within the 
whole shipping company.  
 
For example WINMOS II is an ongoing project which studies the tacit knowledge of ice-
breaker officers. This knowledge has been gained through experience and working at 
sea in ice condition for years and is quite difficult to pinpoint or write down into edu-
cational material for the next generation icebreaker officers. By using simulators with 
ice scenarios, interviews and observations in real life context it has been possible to 
gain understanding of the decision making of ice breakers in action, the way they 
”read” ice conditions and make judgement calls about favourable route in ice. Ice na-
vigation in general can be seen as a competitive advantage of shipping companies, 
but if this intangible asset of knowledge stays on in the mind of individuals, it can be 
lost as the persons leave. 
 
3) A captain of a vessel can be seen as a leader of his/her crew and is a key person in 
safety development. Whenever there is a need for development, new ways of working 
are sought and old ones left behind, it is question of change. Things like empower-
ment and motivation of the crew towards continuous safety development calls for 
leadership skills as does for example ensuring psychological safety to support spea-
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king up and efficient communication and team work within the whole crew of a ves-
sel. Even the captain can be seen as a key persons in safety development, literature 
and research in the area of maritime safety leadership is quite limited (Theotokas et 
al. 2014). This could be an issue addressed both to the maritime academies as well as 
shipping companies jointly to develop already existing training to face future needs, 
create new leadership training to ensure that the intangible assets through which the 
shipping company and the vessel gains its competitive advantage stays within the 
company and the vessel. 
 
To lead people also in an area of flexible rule making and culture of self-regulation 
might need a different kind of approach than the traditional leadership to ensure 
compliance to rules and regulations. If the seafarer is expected to question superior 
officer decision making or question the ways of working, the climate of a vessel needs 
to support this kind of action. A vessel is traditionally quite hierarchical, which has its 
reasoning, but self-regulative crew that constantly seeks for improvement and thinks 
about safety might present new challenges for leadership. And research in this area is 
still quite limited.  
  
4) Research has shown that seafarers feel their seamanship is not valued (Antonsen 
2009, 123; Knudsen 2009, 297; Lappalainen 2016, 89). This seamanship however can 
be seen as a core value of seafaring which can positively influence safety and direct 
action in the area of unpredictability that requires some level of flexibility in rule 
making. A company should create such an environment, where good seamanship is va-
lued and nurtured. In order to know how the seafarers perceive the importance of 
good seamanship in their vessel, some research could be done to understand the cur-
rent situation and find out possible development areas.  
6 Conclusion 
Due to the fact that the environment we operate in in today’s world is getting more complex, 
it has been found that traditional means of safety management and risk assessments are not 
sufficient anymore to ensure safety. This research has pointed out that safety is bound to a 
particular situation, which can change from one moment to the next especially in complex 
systems. Even though one situation might be similar to another, the available resources like 
time, skills and knowledge of people, information at hand, location, time of day, technologi-
cal solutions etc. can all vary from one moment to the next. Performance adjustments are 
needed and this requires flexibility and resilience in the operational environment. Safety is 
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created again and again as the situation evolves from one moment to the next. Also, the op-
erators and decision makers in a particular situation influence the nature of the event and 
paths of its evolvement as they make decisions and take action. Safety is dynamic, not static 
and it does not automatically exist, and therefore, requires constant striving towards creating 
and maintaining safety.  
 
As Grote (2015) stated uncertainty being in the heart of risk and safety should be promoted 
by not only reducing, avoiding, maintaining and transferring risk and uncertainty, safety 
should be promoted by increasing uncertainty in order to pursue opportunity. These similar 
conclusions were made by Limnell et al. (2014) where pointing out that we highlight too much 
the threats and risks that the cyber space represents and forget the possibilities it provides 
us. Hence, ensuring safety and security is about balancing between threats and possibilities.  
 
Hollnagel again introduces us to the ETTO –principles by discussing the trade-off’s between 
efficiency and thoroughness. We make these decisions on a daily basis whether at work or at 
home. We choose to be fast instead of thorough, we take short-cuts to win time and experi-
ment new ways of working to save resources. As situation change, so does the way people 
work. People learn to accomplish work tasks with conflicting rules as they can see what is es-
sential and what is not, and regardless the fact that rules and procedures are not always fol-
lowed, work is usually completed in a successful way. Therefore, Hollnagel argues that under-
standing how work is carried out on daily basis, is the source of understanding how something 
usually works and rarely fails.  
 
Changing safety thinking is about seeing the glass half full instead of seeing it half empty. It is 
about seeing the human element as a source of innovative development and competitive ad-
vantage. Conflicting rules and emerging ad hoc situation push people to come up with new 
ways of working to get the job done making them a crucial part of successful operations due 
to their capacity to vary their performance. Therefore, this performance variability should 
not be constrained. Work processes in a complex environment cannot be described in detail, 
which means that some level of flexibility is needed for adjustments and performance varia-
bility. And as Hummerdal et al. stated, it is more about providing the room for people to 
complete job tasks safely than making it impossible for them to do the job unsafely. This way 
thinking is also a beginning to see, that safety and production efficiency are not that contra-
dicting, but more of a question about balance where one cannot be successful without the 
other.  
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There is no such a thing than absolute safety, nor should there be. In order to learn and pur-
sue opportunities, we need to step outside the comfort zone and face ad hoc situations. The 
uncertainty that we face contains both threats and opportunities. In order to tolerate the fact 
that not all will necessarily go as planned, we need resilience to ensure that when disturb-
ances occur, operations and system functioning will carry on. Correct balancing between flex-
ible rules and compliance to best practices are needed. This requires also that the people are 
able to work with flexible rules, face safely new emerging ad hoc situations and make deci-
sions which are in line with overall company policies and principles, the core values and 
needed safety standards. This raises the questions about education and training and further 
research in the field of maritime safety, because as the times change, our safety thinking has 
to change with it. 
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Arctic Maritime Safety – The Human Element seen from the 
Captain’s Table 
 
Johanna Salokannel, Harri Ruoslahti, Juha Knuuttila 
 
Abstract  The maritime industry is safety critical, where the element of uncertainty is present especially 
when entering high-risk shipping areas like the Arctic. The element of uncertainty increases, as the working 
environment gets more unpredictable and systems more complex. Unpredictability and complexity is mak-
ing it difficult to define comprehensively and in advance which exact courses of action one should take 
when facing challenging ad hoc situations while navigating the Arctic. The human element is a vital part 
of successful and safe shipping in the Arctic. Resent resilience engineering and safety studies see the human 
element and their ability to adapt and adjust their performance to situations and to inaccurate work descrip-
tions as a key to successful operations. High performance of the crew strongly contributes to the high per-
formance of the ship where the captain plays a key role. This chapter addresses the safety issues in a more 
holistic way including uncertainty and unpredictability as a part of safety management in the Arctic ship-
ping.  
 
Keywords  Maritime Safety, human element, shipping, arctic shipping, safety management 
 
 
Introduction 
The global climate change and melting sea ice has opened, at least for part of the year, new routes for 
shipping in the Arctic. The attractiveness of the new routes is in cutting the distance between the Pacific 
and Atlantic oceans enabling ships to save a considerable amount of time between ports, but navigating in 
the Arctic is not without risk. As a business case that saves time and resources on every journey makes the 
route attractive. But risks, if realized, might end up being more costly in increasing insurance premiums, 
damage to the ship, environmental pollution and putting crews at risk reducing profitability. However, re-
gardless of the risks, the Arctic routes are an opportunity and shipping in the Arctic will most likely increase 
in the future. 
In the maritime accident investigation, human error has been counted to be the cause in around 80-90% 
cases. Crews are still needed to sail ships and deal with daily challenges in high risk areas making the 
human element of a great interest from a safety management point of view. 
This chapter focuses on the human element in the Arctic, where not all risks can be predicted and re-
quirements for safety are high. Detailed descriptions of which action to take in occurring ad hoc situations 
are difficult, if not impossible to make. This means also that safety needs to be ensured with other means 
than just compliance to rules and/or best working practices. The objective of this chapter is to study how to 
ensure safety of navigation in the Arctic in situations where the exact risks are not known or when faced 
with safety critical situations that require rapid reaction and responding to when there are no sufficient 
instructions or experience to rely on. 
 
The Arctic shipping routes are still unfamiliar and even there is information available, there is not that 
much experience amongst seafarers, if the routes open up for greater traffic. With time there will be expe-
rience based learning and shared information and lessons learnt. Before this happens, the safety of Arctic 
shipping needs to be created with seafarers who most likely face unexpected and unpredictable situations. 
Compared to other high-risk areas like those with for example high traffic density or pirates, the exposure 
to the risks are usually much shorter compared to the Arctic where the journey can last around two weeks 
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depending on the speed. Due to the remoteness of the area and lack of infrastructure, if something happens, 
help can be very far away. 
 
 
1.   Risks of Arctic Shipping  
 
Working at sea, the seafarers are faced with various risk factors on a daily basis from harsh storms at sea 
to loading in ports. On the Arctic routes, risks are even higher. The extreme climate of the Arctic with its 
low temperatures, extraordinary light conditions and sudden storms as well as magnetic phenomena make 
the area quite distinctive. Navigating in the Arctic can pose challenges due to, for example magnetic com-
passes becoming unreliable at such high latitudes. GPS and GALILEO have reduced coverage, radio, sat-
ellite and communication signals are less reliable in such remote areas. Navigational charts and navigational 
information can be inaccurate and limited in number (Jensen 2007; Carpenter and Wyman 2014; Wright 
and Zimmerman 2015). 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), responsible for creating regulatory framework for in-
ternational shipping industry, adopted the Polar Code (the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters) in November 2014 and related amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS). This, however, does not solely ensure the safety of life, property and the environment 
while sailing in the Arctic. Restricted visibility due to fog and darkness, harsh weather, cold and violent 
storms still put serious demands on the crew. If a ship encounters difficulties, help, like Search and Rescue, 
repair and salvage services, can be very far away. In addition, if a crewmember is injured or becomes 
seriously ill, hospitalization poses challenges due to the remoteness of the Arctic routes.  
As an example, the MV Clipper Adventurer cruise ship ran aground on 27th of August 2010 in the Cor-
onation Gulf, Canada. Canadian Coast Guard dispatched on 28th the nearest icebreaker, Amundsen, to assist 
the ship that was 500 km away. The icebreaker was estimated to arrive at the scene at 09:00 next morning 
on 29th. Luckily, weather conditions were good, which made the ship stay safely stuck on a rock until help 
arrived. (Stewart and Dawson 2011) 
Not so fortunate, T/S Maksim Gorkiy, sailing from Iceland to Spitsbergen, collided with ice floe in heavy 
fog close to midnight between 19th and 20th of June, 1989. She was damaged as the ice ripped holes the hull, 
one of 10 meter long and some smaller ones to the bow. The ship started to sink. The first distress call was 
sent shortly after the accident. Even though a Norwegian Coast Guard rescue vessel, Senja, arrived at the 
scene within a few hours at 4:15 am, around 1.000 people had to abandon ship into lifeboats near freezing 
temperatures while 120 crewmembers stayed onboard fighting to keep the ship afloat. (The New York 
Times; Marchenko 2015) 
Floating ice poses also challenges for navigation. Small icebergs like growlers and bergy bits are difficult 
to detect with satellites and radar especially during rough weather as they are mainly submerged. Ice for-
mation on deck and hatch covers can create problems for ship stability and deck equipment, which needs 
to be removed regularly. Entering an icy ship deck in darkness and harsh weather places the crewmembers 
at risk. Harsh conditions can also make the crew members more fatigue and affect daily work. Extreme 
cold can cause problems to the engine, fuel transfer and pumps needed for firefighting, which could freeze 
from excess water inside. Lacking or limited external facilities to repair breakdowns pose challenges and 
therefore many kinds of spare parts needs to be carried aboard. Whatever the situation or combination of 
the above mentioned and more, the crew is required to handle it. If help is far away, any small incident 
might escalate into bigger problems, therefore reaction time is of high importance. Any salvage operation 
in harsh, cold and dark weather will not be easy to complete. Therefore, having a qualified, well trained, 
and experienced crew becomes more important than ever. (Carpenter and Wyman 2014) 
The Polar Code recognizes that in the safe operation of a ship in the Arctic waters attention needs to be 
paid to the human element regarding their skills and knowledge. Therefore, all ships operating in polar ice-
covered waters should carry at least one Ice Navigator. IMO defines the Ice Navigator as: “any individual 
who, in addition to being qualified under the STCW Convention, is specially trained and otherwise qualified 
to direct the movement of a ship in the ice-covered waters” (IMO 2010) 
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2.   The human element and human error 
The safety management of shipping has been focusing on unwanted outcomes, by investigating past acci-
dents and predicting future risks and their probabilities. Naturally, it is important to understand what has 
gone wrong, and what could go wrong in the future in order to create safety guards to prevent these from 
happening again, or to protect against their outcomes. However, the increase of automation and digitaliza-
tion in our socio-technical systems has created processes and interconnections that are starting to be intrac-
table making it both difficult to describe and predict all possible scenarios that might go wrong. (Hollnagel 
Pariés and Woods 2011) Considering for example a ship that has interconnections from automated doors 
to navigational instruments and possible engine room systems that are connected to a remote service. The 
equipment can be installed at different times and new software integrated to old one. The complexity of 
these systems is making it difficult to know exactly to which all areas and how one failure affects. The 
complexity is also making it harder to detect failures. 
When future risks are not entirely known, the element of uncertainty will enter the picture and managing 
it becomes of interest. The new Arctic shipping routes represent a high-risk area with the element of uncer-
tainty present, as all possible scenarios of what could go wrong cannot, at least not yet, be comprehensively 
predicted. Grote (2014 p. 71) writes, “Uncertainty is at the heart of risk”. She argues that on top of ac-
knowledging existing uncertainties one needs to understand that uncertainty cannot always be reduced com-
pletely. Therefore, uncertainty becomes a strategic question for a company dealing with risk management. 
With the understanding that uncertainty cannot be reduced entirely, maintaining a level of uncertainty, 
managing it and occasionally even increasing it, should be included in the decision-making of risk manage-
ment in order to improve safety and pursue opportunity.  
Aven and Krohn (2013) discuss probability and risk. They point out that probability is just one way to 
describe uncertainty, and that understanding risk should not be limited only to probabilities as it is too 
narrow view. They point out that when predicting the probability of a certain risk, a hazard or unwanted 
event, the probabilities can be the same for two different cases, but what is emphasized is the level of 
knowledge and data available regarding the phenomena. The “unthinkable” or the “unlikely” can be ignored 
due to assessments based on assumptions or beliefs, that these kinds of phenomena are not likely to happen. 
They argue, that a broader risk perspective is needed that go beyond the probabilities and avoiding only the 
undesired events. The perspective should also include how to improve performance with desired outcomes.  
The safety of Arctic shipping, therefore, should not only rely on predicting risks and their probabilities, 
as the list will most likely be incomplete. Neither will investigating past accidents tell the whole truth about 
how to improve safety. To improve performance in order to improve safety requires understanding of what 
kind of performance to improve. Therefore, more research on what kind of performance leads to success, 
thus to better safety, is needed. To study shipping companies that have operated in the Arctic waters suc-
cessfully could give maritime safety development very valuable input. Research on what makes them suc-
cessful in the Arctic conditions, how their ships and crew manage critical situations and where their success 
originates from, surely will enlighten the safety development as much as studying past accidents and inci-
dents.  
Besnard & Hollnagel (2014) explain this idea quite well while arguing about some myths about safety 
and criticize the concept of human error. They give an example where a system is considered to be safe 
with a very low probability of failure of e.g. where 9 999 times out of 10 000, everything will go well. Then 
there is one unacceptable performance, an accident. The “human error” is considered to be the cause of that 
one accident, but attention is not paid to the 9 999 times where the same course of action has been a success. 
The human error has been seen to be the “cause” of the one unwanted event, but at the same time also 
humans are the source of the 9 999 times of success.  
This principle applies to the Safety-II principles by Hollnagel (2014) and Resilience Engineering 
(Hollnagel Pariès and Woods 2011), where the focus on improving safety should be on actions that go right 
as well as understanding what rarely goes wrong. Performance variability and the normal functioning of a 
system should be studied also in order to understand why the same behavior that usually goes right occa-
sionally makes things go wrong. 
Hollnagel (2009; 2014) argues also, that in the traditional way of looking at the human element and 
human error, humans are seen as the fallible component of a system like machines, where they either work 
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as stated in work procedures or fail to follow them. The principle behind this is that written procedures are 
seen to be correct and the function of a system is predictable. Now, usually those who execute the work 
described in processes and work descriptions are often different from those who design the system, create 
and describe the processes and regulatory work. The more complex the working environment becomes, the 
harder it will be to describe the work procedures and anticipate all conditions. Hence, the execution of work 
tasks exactly as described in the processes and work descriptions cannot always be done in all circum-
stances.  
The decisions humans take in order to accomplish current work tasks, whether during normal operation 
or emergent disturbances, can often be based on limited resources like time, information, tools at hand etc. 
The decisions are made when if more time would have resulted in more information gained, lack of spare 
parts or tools at hand calling for improvisation or lack of manpower possibly relying on less qualified 
persons to do the work. The decisions and courses of action are done based on some level of uncertainty, 
hence the adjustments done in imperfect circumstances to complete work tasks are inevitably approximate. 
Reasons why performance mostly is a success is much the same as why performance at times may fail. 
People in general do not choose failure. Success to complete a task, due to incomplete work procedures and 
uncertainty, needs performance adaptability and variability. Therefore, this cannot be prevented in order to 
eliminate failures and hence, managing safety cannot only be by constraining daily work and decision mak-
ing. (Hollnagel 2009; Hollnagel 2014) 
Best practices and written work procedures are important and the above does not exclude them. How-
ever, especially in high risk areas and when the element of uncertainty is present, merely following best 
practices and following rules, regulations and procedures does not always ensure safety.  
Taking uncertainty into risk management and overall safety management of a ship means firstly that 
managing uncertainty will be part of strategic and operational decision making. In addition, the operation 
of a ship and its navigation cannot always be broken down into work procedures written in detail. Therefore, 
safety cannot be managed only by reducing uncertainty through standardization of work, routines, automa-
tion and stability. High level of routine, standardization and formalization requires that evolving events are 
predictable, that systems can be controlled and are tractable (Grote 2014) 
 
3. The element of uncertainty 
As uncertainty cannot be completely reduced from Arctic navigation, it should be included in the safety 
management and seen both as a positive and negative issue. Grote (2014) introduces a general framework 
to manage uncertainty where uncertainty is reduced, maintained or increased.  In the traditional risk man-
agement, the objective is to reduce uncertainty, to stabilize, standardize and automate. Here control is cen-
tralized. Maintaining uncertainty again has the objective to be flexible and resilient towards uncertainty. It 
is understood that uncertainty cannot be completely reduced in complex environments. Leonhardt et al. 
(2009 p. 2) define Resilience Engineering: ‘Resilience is the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its func-
tioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations 
under both expected and unexpected conditions.’ The objective of maintaining uncertainty is that the system 
is tolerant to disturbances and can recover from them. In these kinds of environments, control needs to be 
decentralized, for example by empowering people. 
Increasing uncertainty becomes relevant for example in the case of innovations and new ways of work-
ing, when better ways are sought and new ideas encouraged. When this happens, existing routines need to 
be left behind.  Therefore, when innovation is needed in high-risk settings, uncertainty has to be increased, 
at least temporarily. Hence, stability and control will naturally be reduced. Also, when questioning authority 
or courses of action, uncertainty will be momentarily increased as questioning raises doubts about the cur-
rent situation, and as new ways and possibilities are sought after. Often these doubts are also the reason 
why people may stay silent. The positive side of increasing uncertainty in decision making is seeing new 
angles and solutions to problems. This can lead to more successful end results or even prevent accidents 
from happening. However, when uncertainty is increased in critical situations by e.g. questioning decision 
making, it is important to know how to reduce uncertainty and regain control of the situation. (Grote 2014) 
High levels of routine, standardization and formalization are needed to create stability, predictability and 
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control. This again reduces the need for ad hoc operations when courses of action are well enough known 
and described beforehand in work processes (for example the checklists ensuring that the important tasks 
have been included). In order to manage situations where uncertainty needs to be increased, control has to 
be decentralized to self-organizing units and performance is not controlled but shaped and directed. Also 
to increase learning, ad hoc situations should be favored. In these situations, humans are faced with uncer-
tainty and new occurring needs to which they have to react. (Grote 2014) 
Doz and Kosonen (2008) write about strategic agility and leading with values. In traditional hierarchical, 
bureaucratic organizations, people were led by compliance to rules and regulations. However, when quick 
decisions and the agility to react fast are needed, the traditional way is a hindrance. A company should be 
lead collectively with normative, internalized operational framework and shared values. This way, quick 
decisions can be made when they need to be made in line with the overall principles, policies and values of 
the company. 
The maritime domain is quite regulated and therefore cannot totally be run like an agile, constantly 
changing company. However, lessons can be learned on how to succeed with uncertainty and unpredicta-
bility by benchmarking the best companies operating in fast changing and turbulent environments. Further 
studies could include how these people are lead in areas with flexible, value-based rules and how the efforts 
of employees are directed towards the same goal. In addition, despite the importance of the master as the 
leader of the ship, research in this area is very limited (Theotokas et al. 2014). Martínez-Córcoles et al. 
(2012) state that hardly any literature can be found regarding team leadership in safety performance settings. 
These are also issues that could benefit a more holistic view of safety management in the Arctic that cannot 
be based only on compliance to rules and working practices due to the unpredictability and uncertainties.  
Standards and procedures are important and the maritime domain is quite regulated, therefore a balance 
between stability and flexibility in high-risk areas is a strategic risk management question of the company. 
Naturally it is important to follow the rules regulating the maritime industry: Safety of Life At Sea (SO-
LAS), The International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) and the Polar Code etc. However, IMO also 
states that there are areas that require continuous improvement and a culture of self-regulating.  
IMO (IMO Safety Culture) defines safety culture as an organization that “gives appropriate priority to 
safety and realises that safety has to be managed like other areas of business.” IMO states also, that ”culture 
is more than merely avoiding accidents or even reducing the number of accidents, although these are likely 
to be the most apparent measures of success. In terms of shipboard operations, it is to do the right thing at 
the right time in response to normal and emergency situations”.  
According to IMO, safety culture is to take root in the professionalism of seafarers, in their attitudes and 
performance; and highlights key activities “to recognise that accidents are preventable through following 
correct procedures and established best practices, constantly thinking safety and seeking continuous im-
provement.” The objective of safety management work should also be to “inspire seafarers towards firm 
and effective self-regulation and to encourage personal ownership of established best practice” (IMO 
Safety Culture). Clearly, there is a need for compliance to rules and regulations, but also when seeking 
continuous improvement, sometimes the old ways of working need to be left behind and new ways are 
introduced. 
Balancing between compliance to rules and following best practices, and the flexibility to seek continu-
ous improvement is important. Flexibility responds to uncertainty and stability answers to the need for 
control (Grote 2014). When entering areas like the Arctic where changing demands and unforeseen situa-
tions occur, the crew needs to have some room to operate, more decentralized authority to make decisions 
and adapt their behavior when facing ad hoc situations and to learn to gain experience. This requires flexi-
bility and resilience to tolerate performance variability and disturbances. At the same time, when flexibility 
exists, individuals who are required to follow flexible rules should be well trained, educated and possess 
the right attitude of good Arctic seamanship. This needs to be supported by the organizational culture to 
ensure, that those who are performing under flexible rules can take advantage of the needed flexibility and 
not get confused, disorientated or violate the rules. The organization needs to build a culture, which is also 
in balance with control and accountability. (Grote 2014) 
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4.   Human resources 
Progoulaki and Theokas (2009) state that human resources are considered to be very crucial to shipping 
companies in creating a competitive advantage. The high performance of a ship is the result of high perfor-
mance of the crew. They emphasize the fact that high performance is a result of successful performance of 
the whole crew working as a team and not just the performance of individuals.  
Theotokas, Lagoudis and Kotsiopoulos (2014) strongly emphasize the role of the ship master as the 
leader of a ship. Seafarers are living and working in a restrained space being long time away from home, 
continuously exposed to sea originated risks. The ship master as the leader of the ship and its crew is the 
key person for successful operations and hence leading also the safety of a ship which has been highlighted 
also by Martínez-Córcoles et al. (2012)  
Liu et al. (2009) argue that team agility and rapid reaction is important to efficiently respond to the 
turbulent, competitive, and ever changing needs of the business environment. Also from a business per-
spective, Doz and Kosonen (2008) emphasize strategic agility as an answer to constant change, uncertainty 
and unpredictability. Successful, agile companies learn to operate in turbulent environments and under 
constant change where the achieved status is never taken for granted but must be constantly worked for. 
One aspect of agility is the collective commitment to goals, where the success of operations is the success 
of the whole company and not just the success of individuals.  
 
5. Multicultural shipping  
Shipping has a global labor market, which also leads to multiculturalism onboard. To succeed in creating a 
high performance crew, the company should recruit high quality employees from the global labor market. 
They should be lead and motivated and the company should make an effort to ensure that they will stay 
with the company. Frequent turnover of crew can lead to loss of important human resources and tacit 
knowledge. (Progoulaki and Theotokas 2009; Theotokas et al. 2014) 
If crew turnover is high, rules and formalized working procedures are needed to ensure that the job gets 
done as required when one seafarer is changed for another. Formalization of work and work roles, written 
and enforced rules and procedures, high levels of routine can affect both flexibility and the social interac-
tions of the crew. Social isolation and discrimination can occur onboard when seafarers are not trained to 
handle multiculturalism. Social and intercultural confrontations influence team cohesion negatively, affect-
ing the performance of a crew as a team. To operate successfully, the crew, the people who live and work 
together, should have both the necessary official certificates and the personal ability to work as a member 
of the ship’s team. When the crew consists of different nationalities with different cultural backgrounds and 
experiences, the role of the ship master as the leader of the ship becomes very important. The hard and soft 
skills of a master, the abilities to lead, motivate, inspire and empower the crew are vital for safe, effective 
and efficient operation of a ship. (Progoulaki and Theotokas 2009; Theotokas et al. 2014) 
Bergheim et al. (2014) studied the relationship between psychological capital (PsyCap), job satisfaction 
and safety perceptions in the maritime industry. PsyCap consists of four dimensions. Firstly one’s belief to 
successfully execute and accomplish tasks. Secondly optimism, the tendency to have positive attitude to-
wards the future events. Thirdly hope and a tendency to persistently pursue goals and change paths if needed 
to succeed. Fourthly resiliency, the ability to positively cope, tolerate and bounce back when faced with 
problems and challenges.  
Their results indicated that PsyCap in the maritime industry, is positively correlated with safety climate 
when both personal and situational factors were relevant regarding workplace safety. They also argued, that 
safety climate perceptions could be more than just reflections of formal education and training in the job. 
It could reflect the individual motivational state of seafarers, which “could be subject to training and lead-
ership processes” (2014 p. 31). They also argue, that PsyCap represents a new perspective for leadership 
and safety management to improve safety. The cultural backgrounds of the crew should also be taken into 
consideration, as different factors that influence safety climate could be dependent on the culture. 
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6.   Continuous improvement of safety and crew involvement 
Getting crewmembers to participate in safety related issues and activities are important. Safety participa-
tion of the crew, a proactive behavior towards safety, makes it possible to identify and detect non-con-
formities in processes, practices and the entire system. This is essential for continuous improvement and 
developing a good safety culture defined by IMO (IMO Safety Culture). Safety compliance is following 
rules and regulations, wearing personal protection equipment and performing activities needed to ensure 
workplace safety. Safety participation again is more of voluntary nature where the crewmembers for ex-
ample voluntarily take initiative in safety tasks and safety improvement work. Personal motivation to par-
ticipate in safety activities and safety knowledge are significant indicators of safety participation. It can 
be enhanced and significantly influenced by empowering leadership style. (Martínez-Córcoles et al. 2012) 
Murphy (2014) emphasizes the importance of leadership also. He is reflecting the principles from mil-
itary world into the modern, complex business world with the elements of uncertainty and unpredictabil-
ity present. Murphy (2014) emphasizes leadership, because it affects all aspects of a high-performing 
team and ensures their success as a team. Effective leaders do not only order, but also listen actively to 
ideas of their team members. This enables creative thinking and problem solving from new directions. 
 Unpredictability in the Arctic shipping routes can require at times creative thinking, fast responding 
and performance adjustments to occurring ad hoc situational needs. Team coherence, proactive behavior 
towards safety and continuous improvement can all be influenced by leadership. In these situations, also 
communication is highlighted, especially in safety critical situations.   
 
 
7.   Communication  
Mazaheri et al. (2015) state in their case study on accident and incident reports on grounding, that appro-
priate communication and cooperation in studied incident cases stopped the situation from becoming seri-
ous. When inappropriate communication is present at the ship’s bridge, information flow is interrupted. 
This will increase the likelihood of errors. They also point out that there is a strong link between inappro-
priate communication and personal factors in the incident reports in general, showing that the personalities 
of the crew affect safety through inappropriate communication. They also highlight proper interaction be-
tween the crewmembers. 
Chauvin et al. (2013) highlights the same, where they state that most collisions are due to decision 
errors. Inter-ship communication problems and bridge resource management deficiencies are closely linked 
to collisions in restricted waters while having a pilot onboard. In cases of collision with another vessel while 
having a pilot onboard, 43 cases were linked to breakdowns in communication on the bridge, between the 
vessels or in the teamwork on the bridge.  
Appropriate communication and speaking up, as in expressing one’s mind or concerns aloud, are im-
portant for safety, as they open up new perspectives for decision-making and action. The master of the ship 
is in a key role to create an atmosphere and culture on the ship, where crewmembers feel free to express 
their minds, speak up and feel that their contribution is valued and appreciated. They also need psycholog-
ical safety, where team members do not fear punishment or embarrassment when they question certain 
courses of action or come forward with new ideas for improvement. In time-critical situations, speaking up 
is emphasized.  As pointed out earlier, appropriate communication could have prevented many accidents 
and near miss situations. However, speaking up should be done in a constructive, non-threatening way. 
Crewmembers should be encouraged to speak up, but at the same time understand that it is a two-way street. 
It is also important to be able to receive feedback and adequately react when spoken to. (Grote 2014) 
Grote (2014) points out too, that appropriate communication between the team and speaking up needs 
a general culture of trust, psychological safety and systematic training. These are organizational actions to 
support the teams and especially team leaders to create such a culture and routines that enable appropriate 
behavior to speak up and adequate reacting when spoken to.  
Palttala and Vos (2012) have a Strategy map for crisis communication supporting crisis management, 
which can also be used to understand communication in the framework of continuous improvement and 
safety participation.  
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Fig. 1  Onboard crisis management communication framework (based on Palttala and Vos (2012) : Strategy 
map for crisis communication supporting crisis management by public organisations). 
In the figure 1. Above, communication goals are divided into three: empowerment, understanding, and 
cooperation. On the communication process level every crewmember is empowered to actively participate 
in the monitoring of the ship’s safety needs, while at the same time understanding the framework of com-
pany guidelines and formal regulations. Their successful cooperation is demonstrated in efficient and co-
hesive responses to changes in the environment. Team agility and rapid reaction, for example, are important 
to efficiently respond to the changing needs in the ship’s environment. On a learning and growth level 
continuous evaluation, preparedness, and best practices promote accountability and retention of lessons 
learned. 
As an example of this could be team work at the bridge with increased look out for growlers and sub-
merged icebergs that are hard to detect. A multicultural crew with different cultural backgrounds, language 
barriers and difficulties in interpersonal cooperation can create challenges for efficient communication. 
Training and leadership can help to overcome these challenges. 
 
8.  Conclusion and discussion 
The Arctic is an environment where uncertainty and unpredictability are present. Hence, not all can be 
described in best practices to be followed neither can all risks be reduced, at least not yet. The human 
element is still needed to get the job done in all circumstances from normal operation to handling incidents 
and surviving accidents. IMO states that, safety culture should take root in the professionalism of seafarers, 
where competency, training and attitudes are important.  
For the safe, sustainable and profitable shipping in the Arctic, attention needs to be paid to human re-
sources. Hiring high performing seafarers from the global labor market to create a high performance team, 
and working for team unity and trust will enhance team performance and constant improvement. Strength-
ening the belief in safety-oriented actions and empowering every crewmember towards safety participation 
and constant improvement are important in creating a self-regulating culture. The crew also needs to believe 
that what they say and do matters and is valued.  
Trust and psychological safety are important in promoting speaking up and appropriate communication 
within a crew team. In the modern multicultural environment of shipping, the hard and soft skills of a 
master, the abilities to lead, motivate, inspire and empower the crew are vital for safe, effective and efficient 
operation of a ship. As the seafarers are not usually trained to handle multiculturalism onboard, it is left for 
the captain of the ship to create such an environment, which promotes appropriate communication and 
teamwork. 
In order to work with uncertainty, a high performing self-regulating crew needs a level of flexibility to 
cope with occurring ad hoc situations, to question current ways of working, and to make suggestions for 
continuous improvement. Making flexible rules is a strategic risk and safety management question of the 
company, because also compliance with official rules and regulations as well as best practices are still 
needed to ensure safety of Arctic shipping.  
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It is essential to ensure that the skills and knowledge of the crew develops and that the accumulated 
knowledge is kept within the ship and the company. This will enable the ship as an organization to learn 
from experience and improve constantly its performance and safety of Arctic shipping. 
To lead and manage the safety of a ship is leadership and management of the people living and working 
in the ship. The execution of safety measures lies within the seafarers and their masters working at sea. 
They are the ones who react to and manage situations as they occur. They use their skills and knowledge to 
adapt to shortcomings in processes, work descriptions, equipment, and tools. They are the ones who face 
the sea-originated risks on a regular basis and fight for their survival in case of accidents. This chapter 
argues that from the captain’s point of view, excellent seafarers, their competence, skills, collective attitudes 
and good Arctic seamanship are the key to a safer and more sustainable Arctic shipping. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Shipping industry transports around 90% of 
world trade and caries all different kinds of 
cargo from all parts of the world. Our society 
highly depends on shipping and maritime 
transportation of goods. Over one million 
seafarers and approximately 50 000 mer-
chant ships ensure the operation of ships 
around the clock every day of the year. 
Chauvin et al. (2013, 26) claim that shipping  
is a safe and economical form of transport 
(Chauvin et al., 2013, 26), but also high risk 
industry with considerably higher mortality 
rates than shore based occupations (Jepsen et 
al. 2015, 106; Knudsen, 2009, 295; Hän-
ninen, 2014, 308). In total there were 3 399  
ships involved in the accidents (including  
fishing vessels), 51 ships were lost, 1075 
persons were injured and 136 fatalities 
(EMSA 2015, 3). Allianz Global Corporate  
 
& Speciality in turn reports in their Safety 
and Shipping Review (2015, 2) that 75 large 
vessels were lost world wide, which was the 
lowest in 10 years and 2 773 casualties (in-
cidents). Statistics show the declining trend  
of accidents, but despite the positive trend in 
safety improvements, accidents still happen 
and lives are lost at sea, and as the number 
of accident decrease the potential financial 
loss of one accident is increasing.  
The human performance variability and 
adaptability are at the core of resilience en-
gineering and Safety-II responding to the 
varying conditions of the system ensuring 
that things go right. Hollnagel et al. (2013, 
6) give an example illustrating the reasoning 
behind understanding both failures and suc-
cess. Considering that there is an event that 
is carried out for 10 000 times, of which 9 
999 times are a success and 1 time a failure. 
The efforts and resources are mainly put to 
understand the one failure occurred leaving 
ABSTRACT: It is difficult to design complex systems that are fully predictable. This is leading inevita-
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much less attention to understand why the 9 
999 times were a success. He argues that by 
preventing things going wrong is not suffi-
cient enough to ensure that things will go 
right. We need to know how and why they go 
right. Hollnagel (2014) suggests that in order 
to improve safety, we should focus both on 
the things that have gone wrong i.e. failures 
as well as on success as things going right. 
Therefore, this paper looks at the need for 
performance variability according to the rea-
soning of Safety-II and resilience engineer-
ing. Hindsight drives also the current safety 
development, but in complex, intractable 
systems might not be sufficient enough to 
proactively improve safety. Therefore, this 
paper looks also at tacit knowledge as a 
source of safety improvement and resilience. 
Seamanship is basically the professionalism 
of seafarers that is created through work ex-
perience at sea. Professionalism and experi-
ence contribute significantly in decision 
making especially when involving dynamic 
and complex risks as well as ad hoc situa-
tions. As our operational systems get more 
complex and unpredictable, understanding 
how things go right, studying and capturing 
the tacit knowledge of seamanship could 
point us to a new direction towards improved 
safety at sea and give us more understanding 
of where success originates from.  The paper 
aims to understand the need to change our 
safety thinking, how it relates to shipping 
and find ways to address the issue of safety 
improvement from a new point of view 
based on the principles of resilience engi-
neering and Safety-II by Erik Hollnagel 
(2014). 
 
2. NEW SAFETY THINKING 
2.1. Definition of resilience           
In align with the definition of resilience by 
Leonhardt, Macchi, Hollnagel and Kirwan 
(2009, 2), this study refers it as: “Intrinsic 
ability of a system to adjust its functioning 
prior to, during, or following changes and 
disturbances, so that it can sustain required 
operations under both expected and unex-
pected conditions”.  
 
Resilience is seen as a quality of a system, 
that has four premises (Leonhardt, Macchi, 
Hollnagel and Kirwan, 2009, 2), where 1) 
performance conditions are always under-
specified. This is due to the complexity, in-
terconnectivity and intractability of our sys-
tems. This makes it difficult to specify in de-
tail which actions to take in every possible 
situation. Therefore, people adjust their per-
formance to match the occurring needs. As 
resources like time, information available, 
tools at hand, are finite, the adjustments are 
inevitably approximate. 2) Some adverse 
events can be attributed to a breakdown or 
malfunctioning of components and normal 
system functions, but some are the unex-
pected combination of performance variabil-
ity. 3)  
 
Safety management needs to be both reac-
tive and proactive and not rely solely on 
hindsight, error tabulation and failure proba-
bilities. The past is not necessarily sufficient 
enough to tell how safety should be im-
proved in the future and how safety is cre-
ated. 4) Safety is a part of core (business) op-
erations hence achieving safety should be 
done rather by improvements than con-
straints. Safety should be seen as a means for 
better productivity rather than seeing them 
as contradicting issues. 
 
2.2. The ETTO -principle 
Hollnagel (2009) introduces the ETTO –
principle, which is about the trade-offs’ hu-
mans need to make as a part of everyday per-
formance. ETTO stands for Efficiency-
Thoroughness Trade-Off. In an ideal world, 
when making decisions, there would be 
enough time, resources needed available and 
information sufficient and correct, but often 
this is not the situation. Most common short-
coming is the lack of time, but shortage of 
other resources as information, materials, 
manpower equally could exist. People still 
manage to accomplish their work tasks by 
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adjusting how they do them to meet the cur-
rent conditions. Regarding safety, the trade-
offs’ are often seen as production efficiency 
versus thoroughness. Hence, for example 
short-cuts are done due to time pressure, to 
do things faster with the objective to be more 
efficient. By understanding how things are a 
success and by doing the right thing at the 
right time, safety and production efficiency 
might not need to be trade-offs’ anymore. 
 
2.3 System complexity and performance 
variability 
 
Technology plays an integral part of our to-
day’s society, and in shipping.  
Automation and technological solutions in 
navigation, machinery, remote maintenance 
and monitoring, ballast and other ship oper-
ations is increasing with a rapid pace and un-
manned vessels will sail in the future. De-
spite how automated the system is, humans 
are a part of its functionality in one way or 
another. Systems are designed, built, main-
tained and tested by people, risks assess-
ments, training and manuals are done by 
people. The systems are designed by people 
for a purpose, for an intended use and user. 
Therefore, the human element and the poten-
tial of human error will be almost impossible 
to eliminate from the equation, neither 
should it be. (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005, 4) 
 
Technological systems often function auton-
omously in a stable environment, where the 
environment is specified in detail and noth-
ing unexpected variability will not happen. 
In contrast to that, some environments can-
not be specified completely where humans 
are needed to operate the system, its subsys-
tems and the operating environment. Hu-
man, as the buffer for changes in the opera-
tional environment adjusts his/her perfor-
mance to provide stability for the system to 
work as needed. (Hollnagel, 2014, 119).  
 
In the traditional safety thinking, the systems 
can be taken apart to understand the cause-
effect relationships, where components ei-
ther work or they don’t and the functioning 
is predictable. This predictability again 
made it possible to create detailed instruc-
tions and work procedures. Therefore, peo-
ple were seen as the weak link, where per-
formance variation needed constrains and 
controlling, because deviation from proce-
dures caused malfunctioning. But the mod-
ern socio-technical systems are not decom-
posable, bimodal or predictable anymore.  
 
The operational, socio-technical systems are 
becoming more complex making it difficult 
to understand them, what will happen, how 
it will happen, or why it will happen and, this 
complexity can be defined as intellectual un-
manageability In order to improve safety in 
the era of complexity with the elements of 
unpredictability and uncertainty, we need to 
find new ways to improve safety. 
(Hollnagel, 2014, 97-105; 112- 113; Leven-
son, 2012, 4). 
 
2.4 Risk and hindsight 
A risk and its analysis is often influenced by 
hindsight, by looking at the past mistakes, 
incidents and accidents and reflecting them 
into the future. Past accidents are investi-
gated to find underlying reasons, decisions 
and sequence of actions made to understand 
what did happen and why. The understand-
ing of past events, different defenses like 
new rules and regulations, may be put in 
place to ensure that this kind of accidents 
does not happen again. Our future safety is 
claimed to influenced the way past mistakes 
are understood, how far we have been able 
to reconstruct the events, their prevailing 
conditions, actions of people, organizational 
culture, procedures and managerial systems, 
weather, traffic etc. Then as the new de-
fenses are put in place, it is seen that the fu-
ture is protected to some extent from this 
kind of accident. The accidents are explained 
in linear cause-effect relationships and as we 
create an understanding of how accidents 
happen, we do not still have a sufficient un-
derstanding of how safety is created as it 
does not tell why things usually go right. 
Hindsight biases also the investigation as the 
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accident investigator does most likely have a 
better understanding about the sequence of 
events leading to an accident, the results of 
actions taken and decisions made. We see 
the whole event afterwards in a more holistic 
way than those who were involved in the ac-
cident and making decisions based on the 
most likely limited resources available at 
that particular time. (Dekker, 2006, 23; 
Hollnagel, 2014, 23; Hollnagel et al., 2013, 
3; Hollnagel, Woods & Levenson, 2006, 9) 
 
Hindsight is important for safety and safety 
development, but in complex systems, not 
sufficient enough to create safety. Safety is 
dynamic in the sense that when something is 
safe now, there is no guarantee that nothing 
will happen in the future. Safety is not state 
that is once created and then maintained by 
establishing boundaries for performance. 
Safety in complex systems needs constant 
monitoring, adjusting and management and 
is created again and again usually by people 
through their capacity to adjust their perfor-
mance to meet the occurring situational 
needs and multiple goals. Hence making 
success, and failure for that matter, an emer-
gent phenomena. (Dekker, 2006, 65; 
Hollnagel, Woods & Levenson, 2006, 13)  
 
Schröder-Hindrichs et al. (2013, 244) pro-
pose that even the information gained from 
past accidents and incidents is a valuable 
source of information, other sources should 
be sought after. They point out, that proac-
tive safety requires actions to address safety 
issues and possible solutions before the acci-
dents happen. Berg (2013, 344-345) also 
states that event though shipping is highly 
regulated, the desired level of human perfor-
mance has not been achieved. Human errors 
still count for around 80% of marine acci-
dents at sea world wide and the traffic at sea 
is increasing as is the potential to risk. 
 
3. SEAMANSHIP 
Who is a good seaman and what is seaman-
ship about? There is no unified, specific def-
inition what seamanship is. As one retired 
captain once said: “It is much easier to say 
what is bad seamanship, than what is good. 
You do not really see good seamanship, be-
cause it means that everything is going well 
and the job is getting done. But if you see bad 
seamanship, you will recognize it.”  
 
According to Borg and Åkerblom (2012, 4-
5), a ship’s captain is judged by his/her abil-
ities to handle the ship and the reputation of 
the ship is judged by how well it is taken care 
of. Seamanship is about the practical and 
professional skills, but also about things like 
reading the weather, surrounding traffic sit-
uation, understanding the operational capa-
bilities and limits of the ship and its crew.   
  
A ship is often referred as a ‘total institu-
tion’, a closed entity, that is isolated, limited 
physical space and enclosed social system 
that has a various level of control of its mem-
bers’ lives. At sea, the seafarers spend time 
together around the clock for weeks, even 
months. The ship becomes an alternative, 
miniature society and for some, another fam-
ily. (Antonsen, 2009, 1121; Theotokas et al., 
2014, 321) 
 
Isolation from family and friends and limited 
physical space also influences the under-
standing of good seamanship. Many spoken 
and unspoken rules reflect the social behav-
ior of seamen, as an example leaving the 
door open signals that one may be disturbed, 
while a closed door was a signal for privacy. 
(Antonsen 2009, 1122) Consideration to oth-
ers is highly valued as are cooperation and 
trustworthiness in getting the job done, abil-
ity to deal with conflicts as to avoid them. 
Social skills are needed for a good atmos-
phere and general well-being of all.  
 
Knudsen (2009, 295) defines seamanship as 
a: “blend of professional knowledge, profes-
sional pride, and experience-based common 
sense.” The definition of seamanship is 
much more than what can be learned at 
school. Experience brings abilities to work 
safely according to one’s own judgment, in-
tuition and adaptation to situational needs. It 
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is also about foresight to economize re-
sources and time, as time is often a scares re-
source at sea. It is also about sometimes 
working with multiple and possibly also 
conflicting goals e.g. safety and efficiency. 
It means also capabilities to improvise and 
sometimes even deviate from rules and reg-
ulation in order to get the job done according 
to situational needs. It is about the skills 
needed for seafaring, both practical skills for 
job completion and ‘soft skills’ to manage 
life at sea in isolation, limited physical space 
constantly facing the sea originated risks.   
 
According to Antonsen (2009, 1123) and 
Knudsen (2009, 297) the seafarers value 
their profession and are willing to work hard 
but resent when outsiders tell how the work 
should be done. Seafarers reluctance to-
wards extensive paperwork and check lists is 
demonstrated in an expression (Knudsen, 
2009, 297) as follows: “…It is wearying, be-
cause you have to throw all seamanship 
away. You have to read and do precisely 
what is written. No matter if your own 
thought is better or not, you have to do what 
is written. That means, you stop any devel-
opment, you stop thoughtfulness, and you 
stop seamanship.” This has been pointed out 
also by Lappalainen (2016, 89). In his study 
he referred to an interview with a master, 
who pointed out that older crew members 
were more negative towards ISM Code and 
felt that their skills and experience were not 
appreciated and seamanship is not trusted. 
 
Reluctance towards e.g. increased paper-
work, checklists and written procedures are 
usually due to the perception, that they are 
done by ‘landlubbers’ at shore who have no 
real idea about the life at sea. External pres-
sure about how work should be done seems 
to be offending the pride of seafarers and 
their professionalism, as one of the features 
of seamanship is to pursue towards working 
safely. (Knudsen, 2009,297; Antonsen, 
2009, 1124). 
 
 
4. CONTINUOUS DEVELOPMENT 
AND INCIDENT REPORTING 
 
Studies indicate that the implementation of 
ISM Code reduces accidents. However, the 
studies conducted to determine the impact of 
ISM Code have not produced conclusive ev-
idence. Even though statistics show decrease 
in accidents and some studies indicate that 
operations of shipping companies have im-
proved their performance due to ISM Code, 
there is still need for improvement. The main 
noncompliance with the ISM Code is related 
to the incident reporting, which is at least 
partly due to the prevailing ‘blame culture’ 
within the maritime industry. Incident re-
porting has been seen as the most significant 
indicator of an established safety culture. In-
cident reporting and investigations is seen to 
be an integral part of continuous improve-
ment in the safety management system as it 
can point out the weaknesses and vulnerabil-
ities that need addressing. (Lappalainen, 
2016, 12; 140)  
 
Lappalainen (2016, 136) states that Finnish 
maritime personnel have rather positive atti-
tudes towards safety management and see it 
beneficial. However, they criticize the ex-
cessive documentation, unnecessary bureau-
cracy and poor incident reporting.  In the 
case of Finnish maritime personnel, the in-
sufficiencies in reporting were more due to 
lack of feedback from management and lost 
faith to the fact that the incident reporting ac-
tually will improve safety. The study also re-
vealed, that even the reports are not made, 
the issues are discussed onboard and im-
provements are being made. This indicates, 
that development is happening aboard the 
ship even there is no paper trail to prove it. 
 
Mazaheri et al. (2015) studied both ground-
ing reports and near-miss grounding reports 
to find out what kind of knowledge can be 
extracted from such sources and the usability 
of the reports for evidence based risk model-
ing. They propose that accident reports pro-
vide evidence of contributing factors result-
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ing in an accident but voluntary incident re-
ports could not be seen a very reliable or use-
ful source in their current form. Next, they 
suggest that voluntary reports could be used 
as alerts for possible hazards in the daily op-
eration of shipping. In order to improve the 
near-miss reporting, reporting should be 
more systematic and consistent addressing 
causalities. 
5. GOING FORWARD 
Safety-II focuses on how things go right and 
how to manage performance rather than to 
constrain it, looking at opportunities as well 
as risks. (Hollnagel, 2014, 149) Hummerdal 
et al. (2007 2-5; 12-13) highlight the im-
portance of enhancing people’s adaptive ca-
pacity by giving them room to do the job 
safely rather than constraining and making it 
impossible for them to do the job unsafely. 
Hence, people will perform the job safely 
when the conditions are favorable, rather 
than perform the job unsafely unless told ex-
actly what to do. It is becoming more and 
more difficult to foresee all possible paths to 
failure as a level of complexity in systems 
increase. Safety is a dynamic and emergent 
property of our systems which is constantly 
created again and again. Therefore, the 
emergence of safety depends on flexible, 
adaptive, empowered and proactive people 
actively anticipating different paths to fail-
ure and adapting to emerging situational 
needs to get the job done. (Hollnagel, 2014, 
119)  
 
Risk management is fundamentally about 
decision making under the conditions of un-
certainty (Mauelshagen et al., 2013, 1187). 
Experience and expertise is critical for risk 
management. Expertise is an ability to make 
sense of, and develop solutions by quickly 
recognizing key information in complex 
problems (Mauelshagen et al. ,2013, 1188 
referring Case and Simon 1973). And as 
safety related decisions in ad hoc situations 
are made often with limited resources like 
time and information available, the solutions 
to problems are often approximate. Hence, a 
need to make decisions, intuition and expe-
rience based reasoning are often used and 
unavoidably involving subjective judge-
ment.  In order for an organization to utilize 
the professionalism of their employees, a 
key feature in risk based decision making is 
decentralized decision making expressing 
respect for expertise. A company that en-
courages the growth of expertise knowledge 
and sharing of it enhances interaction be-
tween operational and managerial staff. This 
helps to avoid rules that do not reflect reality. 
(Mauelshagen et al. ,2013, 1188)    
 
The importance of understanding the differ-
ent between work-as-done and work-as-im-
agined has been highlighted also by resili-
ence engineering and principles of Safety-II. 
People at the sharp end are those who actu-
ally do the work. They are the closest to and 
in direct contact with safety-critical pro-
cesses and also are the ones who create 
safety on a daily basis. The people who are 
at the blunt end are those who support and 
shape the activities at the sharp end. The 
blunt end consists of the organization, regu-
latory and administrative parties, govern-
mental parties etc. Blunt end shapes, creates 
and directs the work being done at the sharp 
end indirectly by providing resources, train-
ing and establishing general conditions for 
those who work at the sharp end. Quite often 
there is a gap between the Work-As-Done 
and Work-As-Imagined due to different un-
derstanding of reality. (Dekker, 2006, 59-63; 
Hollnagel, 2014, 40-41) 
 
From the perspective of resilience and safety 
the gap between Work-As-Done and Work-
As-Imagined is of interest. A large distance 
between the two might indicate a misleading 
understanding of risks encountered in real 
operations. Hence, creating work procedures 
and guidelines might not suit the real situa-
tion and force the sharp end to vary their per-
formance in order to get the job done. The 
way forward is to close the gap with the co-
operation of both blunt end and the sharp end 
ensuring that they both are working for a 
common goal. As Fujita states in the book of 
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Hollnagel et. al (2006, 67) “A system should 
only be called ‘resilient’ when it is tuned in 
such a way that it can utilize its potential 
abilities, whether engineered features or ac-
quired adaptive abilities, to the utmost extent 
and in a controlled manner, both in expected 
and unexpected situations.” 
 
6. KNOWLEDGE 
And as Mauelshagen et al. (2013, 1188) 
stated above, respect for expertise, shared 
experiences and trust in each other’s judge-
ment enables effective communication and 
coordination. Shared experiences facilitate 
the common ground for sharing and under-
standing experimental knowledge (exper-
tise), but knowledge sharing is not always 
that simple.  
The role of knowledge and know how are 
considered to be important resources and a 
competitive advantage of organizations. The 
competition in the market place is transfer-
ring from a production economy towards 
knowledge based economy and from mate-
rial property towards immaterial equity re-
quires more efficient and effective use of 
personal knowledge and know how. This 
makes knowledge of interest. Knowledge as 
in the sense of expertise, is not easy to de-
fine. Knowledge is a multidimensional and 
ambiguous notion, roughly consisting of two 
main elements, explicit and implicit 
knowledge. Explicit knowledge is visible. It 
can be codified and transferred verbally, 
through documentation and various infor-
mation management systems. Implicit 
knowledge again is hidden, so called “silent” 
or tacit knowledge. It is non-verbal 
knowledge, which is difficult to share, trans-
fer or express verbally. It is something that 
we do not know, we know. (Puusa & Ee-
rikäinen, 2010, 307) 
Michael Polanyi introduced the concept of 
tacit knowledge in 1946, so it is not some-
thing new, but the interest of tacit knowledge 
has grown along with the understanding of 
the importance of knowledge capital and in-
tangible competitive advantage. Expert 
knowledge is often seen as tacit knowledge, 
difficult to describe and verbalize by the ex-
perts themselves. (Haase et al., 2013, 236). 
Some knowledge we have are tied to senses, 
skills of bodily movement, perceptions, gut 
feeling and intuition. Such knowledge is 
hard to describe to others, but can be very 
important in safety critical decision making. 
Recognizing the value of tacit knowledge 
and how to use it is a key challenge in 
knowledge-creating company. It requires 
good communication, conversations and 
good personal relationships. And it also 
makes a powerful tool for innovation. (Von 
Krogh, Ichijo & Nonaka, 2000, 6-7) 
Tacit or implicit knowledge and explicit 
knowledge are not separate categories, but 
an integral part of knowing. Tacit knowledge 
helps us to determine when to trust explicit 
knowledge. They are not counterpoints to 
one another, but sides of the same coin com-
plementing each other. Tacit knowledge 
guides our decision making, is personal in-
cluding subjective views, ideals, values and 
emotions. Tacit knowledge can be shared 
also non-verbally through practice and com-
mon experience. In order to deal with and 
develop explicit knowledge according to 
Puusa & Eerikäinen (2010, 309), we need 
tacit knowledge as backround knowledge.  
Tacit knowledge is something that is invisi-
ble and difficult to address, but empirical 
studies show that tacit knowledge related to 
work life can be research and made more ex-
plicit. Tacit knowledge is also like an ice 
berg, on the tip 10% is above water and vis-
ible while the rest 90% remains hidden 
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(Bhardwaj and Monin, 2006, 72). One of the 
reasons why tacit knowledge has been re-
search is the concern, that due to retirement 
of experienced people, valuable information 
will be lost. (Pohjalainen, 2012, 2). To share 
tacit knowledge is based on social interac-
tion, which requires psychological safety for 
people to let down their guards and start to 
speak up freely (Suur-Inkeroinen, 2012, 24). 
A very typical and traditional way of trans-
ferring tacit knowledge has been the master 
and apprentice, where knowledge is trans-
ferred both verbally and non-verbally via ob-
servations, participation in work tasks and 
social interaction. Other methods are e.g. 
storytelling, works shops, participation in 
development projects and interviews. Tacit 
knowledge can be reach best by observing a 
work and discussing it afterwards. By meth-
odological interview, but not so much by tra-
ditional interviews or questioners. (Bhard-
waj and Monin, 2006, 74, Pohjalainen, 2012, 
9-10).   
Further studying tacit knowledge could be a 
way to address safety issues according the 
new safety thinking, where the importance is 
to understand both failures and success. 
Tacit knowledge addresses expertise, which 
is developed through time and gained by 
work experience. Hence, this could also be a 
way to study seamanship and the reasons 
why accomplishing work tasks is mainly a 
success as incidents and accidents still are 
quite a rare event.   
7. CONCLUTION 
The importance of experience and profes-
sionalism can be seen from the studied liter-
ature, both for organizational success and for 
safety. And as stated before by Mauel-
shangen et al. (2013, 1187) the role of expe-
rience has been shown to be critical for risk 
management and decision making in ad hoc 
situations. In order for an organization to 
fully utilize the potential of expertise, they 
should express respect for expertise by de-
centralizing decision making. This will en-
hance the exchange of information and coor-
dination between operational and manage-
rial staff. Which again for its part will enable 
to avoid rules to be made that do not reflect 
reality.  
This is supported by Resilience engineering 
and Safety-II thinking also. According to 
Hollnagel (2014) the work that is being done 
at the sharp end is often different from the 
people who write the rules and regulations at 
the blunt end. The bigger the gap between 
the work-as-done at the sharp end and work-
as-imagined at the blunt end, the more diffi-
cult it will be address risks and create safety 
guards that actually do reflect reality. Hence, 
deficiencies in work processes puts even 
more pressure for people at the sharp end to 
adapt and vary their performance to get the 
job done.  
Performance variability and adaptability of 
humans is in the core of resilience. Complex 
systems are starting to be quite intractable 
and therefore, also difficult to describe in de-
tail. This makes also the descriptions and 
guidelines for which action to take in a par-
ticular situation incomplete. As decision 
making and problems solutions is often done 
with limited resources like time, information 
at hand, manpower etc. solutions to particu-
lar problems are also usually approximate. 
However, this usually results in successful 
operation. Hence, performance variability is 
an important factor in successful operation 
in complex systems. Expertise and profes-
sionalism contributes to decision making es-
pecially in safety and risk related emergent 
situations. 
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Expertise organisations should invest in 
sharing and transferring knowledge and 
knowhow and especially when there is a risk 
of losing a lot of knowhow with people who 
are leaving e.g. due to retirement. Acknowl-
edging and respecting the importance exper-
tise and reflecting it into the organizational 
culture will enhance sharing of critical infor-
mation. At the same time the organization is 
ensuring its own knowledge capital and 
competitive advantage based on expertise in 
its field. However, transferring tacit 
knowledge is not easy and the social rela-
tionships, trust, psychological safety and 
good communication play a big role. Psy-
chological is about not having to be afraid of 
punishment, rejection, or embarrassment af-
ter speaking up (Grote, 2015, 75).  
Research shows that there is a lack of respect 
towards seamanship to some extent or at 
least it is perceived that way by the seafarers. 
They are however, a valuable asset to their 
organizations as a source of expertise and 
from the point of view of resilience, a source 
of resilience due to their capacity and ability 
to adjust and vary their performance to the 
occurring needs. The more complex and dy-
namic the situation the more will the good 
safety related decisions rely on professional-
ism and expertise of the experienced, skilled 
seafarers.  As safety in interconnected and 
complex systems is an emergent and dy-
namic phenomena, safety is created again 
and again by the seafarers at sea on regular 
basis.  
Investigating tacit knowledge will give the 
opportunity to focus on what is actually done 
at the sharp end, as highlighted by Hollnagel 
(2014). Understanding the work-as-done and 
comparing it with the work-as-imagined, 
will have the opportunity to close the possi-
ble gap between these two and therefore also 
ensure that risks and their safety guards are 
reflecting the reality. Studying tacit 
knowledge also sometimes points to needs 
for unlearning, and therefore not all infor-
mation and knowledge is of use. Neither can 
all the made explicit. Some information will 
stay hidden forever. (Suur-Inkeroinen, 2012, 
89) 
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THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF MARITIME SAFETY 
An Essay 
Johanna Salokannel 
 
“What is essential is invisible to the eye.” 
 Antoine de Saint Exupéry 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Tens of millions of tons of chemicals are transported in the Baltic Sea on yearly basis and the 
traffic is increasing. Harsh winter conditions and dense traffic situations increase the risk of a 
largescale maritime Hazardous and Noxious Substance (HNS) incident and in the worst case, 
Search and Rescue (SAR) operations in worst conditions. The primary objective of SAR opera-
tions is to save human lives. (ChemSAR) For the rescue authorities the SAR process starts when 
they get a distress call from the vessel in distress. For the distress vessel crew it will start earlier, 
from the moment of detection of a chemical spill. Therefore, as an event that has a start and an 
end, the HNS incidents should be viewed from the moment of the incident discovery to the mo-
ment people are safe or otherwise operations concluded as ended. Even in the Baltic Sea, external 
help from rescue authorities does not arrive immediately. Hence, how the distress vessel crew 
response to the situation at hand before the external help arrives is essential and does have an 
impact on the whole SAR operations.  
Shipping companies and ship crews are required by law to create their own emergency proce-
dures, have regular drills and be as prepared as possible for a HNS incident. However, seafarers 
are not professionals in HNS incidents and face these situations very rarely in real life, if at all. 
External help, whether it is consultation via radio or telephone or physical intervention, is most 
likely needed. But, if an incident or an accident happens, whether external help available or not, 
seafarers are required to act and make decisions in dynamic, safety critical and hazardous situa-
tions. 
In a HNS incident, the properties of the actual HNS involved has a great impact on the situation 
at hand making the premade emergency instructions quite general in nature. The Captain of a ship 
is left with many questions and decisions to make that might have limited amount of predefined 
answers. The preliminary assessment of the situation, information at hand and potential risks will 
determine the first response actions onboard that can have an impact for the success of whole 
SAR operation. The resources at sea are limited and time can be a critical factor. Still systematic, 
dynamic risk assessment tools for seafarers seems to be lacking to support decision making under 
high level of stress in a safety critical, dynamic situation. 
Many risk assessment methods focus on preventing accidents and/or ensuring that the disaster 
recovery operations and disaster management is conducted in the most efficient and safe way 
possible. This forms a way for strategical organizational planning (Asbury and Jacobs, 2012). 
This is also essential for maritime safety management. However, many of these risk assessment 
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methods are done in a static situation, where there is time to do research, have workshops, dis-
cussions and calculations to identify the hazards and assess their probabilities and impact. They 
are often time consuming and sometimes complex. These methods and techniques lack the ability 
to take into account the need for assessing risk in a dynamic, changing situation of an operation 
where new knowledge emerges from one moment to the next, the situation can evolve in an un-
predictable manner and ways of working need to be adjusted accordingly to the ever changing 
operational environment. (Asbury and Jacobs, 2012)  
There is very limited amount of literature regarding the concept of tactical aspect of safety in the 
maritime world even though elements like training and skills are acknowledged to have an impact 
of safety. There are references in the ice navigation for tactical planning while navigating in ice. 
In ice navigation, the general route from A to B is planned on a strategical level, but while navi-
gating in the ice, tactical decisions need to be made in order to find the most favourable route 
through the ice. Tactical planning is about reading the equipment and available resources on the 
bridge like satellite-based ice charts, radar and look out (Kjerstad, 2011, 133). There are also tools 
like check lists, emergency procedures and exercises to address safety in a ad hoc safety critical 
situation, but these might not cover all needed aspects to ensure safety in a emergent situation like 
an accident. Many of these address the question of What needs to be done? But fail to address the 
How? of a particular situation. How to assess a situation and how to detect the correct risks of the 
actions we are about to take? How to choose one path from another or make sense of the constant 
information flow? Part of these skills comes also with experience and is regarded to be profes-
sionalism and tacit knowledge, but by developing methods and tools to support decision making 
when there is not experience about a certain issue would enhance safety also. 
Maritime domain is quite regulated and safety is often seen to about compliance, even though 
constant improvement and self-regulation is acknowledged. According to IMO, safety culture is 
to take root in the professionalism of seafarers, in their attitudes and performance; and highlights 
key activities “to recognise that accidents are preventable through following correct procedures 
and established best practices, constantly thinking safety and seeking continuous improvement.” 
The objective of safety management work should also be to “inspire seafarers towards firm and 
effective self-regulation and to encourage personal ownership of established best practice” (IMO 
Safety Culture). But, what happens when the established correct procedures have shortages and 
limitations?  
The objective of this Essay is to address the dynamic and emergent nature of safety and its impli-
cations of on the maritime world, specially the human element at sea, the seafarers. The following 
chapters have the aim to open up the thinking behind complexity and unpredictability. Why, in 
spite of our best efforts to ensure safety, we still have difficulties to predict the future and hence 
also, create safety guards to all possible situations. The future contains uncertainties, but we still 
need to ensure safety also in situations where we do not know the risks. 
 
2 Safety Paradoxes 
 
James Reason discusses safety paradoxes (Reason, 2000) that arises from our complex systems 
and interweaved connections within the system and its surroundings (Hanén and Huhtinen, 9-11). 
Paradox can be defined as “a statement contrary to received opinion; seemingly absurd though 
perhaps well-founded” (Reason 2000, 9 referring to Concise Oxford Dictionary). As we pursue 
to achieve better safety for example by constantly increasing the amount of rules and regulations, 
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we ourselves contribute to increasing complexity. When e.g. the legislative system we create 
reaches a certain point of complexity, the rules we have increased inevitably start to contradict. 
For us to improve safety, it is essential that we acknowledge the existence and understand these 
paradoxes. (Reason 2000, 3; Hanén and Huhtinen, 9) 
The roots of International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) goes 
back to early 1800’s. As the first steam ships started to appear, the risk of having a collision with 
traditional sailing vessels emerged. To respond to this emerging new risk, some rules to avoid 
collision were formulated in 1840s and in 1864 the main regulations to avoid collision at sea were 
codified. These rules have been modified during the years, last time in 1995, and we know them 
now as COLREGS. (Belcher 2002, 213-214)  
The situation at sea, the ships, their speed and amount of traffic has changed since 1840’s and as 
the COLREGS have evolved over time some conflicts and paradoxes has emerged. COLREGS 
apply well for encounter of two vessels, but for more than two the COLDREGS rules can start to 
contradict. An example of this is an encounter of three or more different vessels, where one vessel 
A is taking over another one, vessel B. Both having the same heading. At the same time there is 
crossing traffic, which needs to be taken into account. This overtaking vessel A will be in position, 
where she is the give-way vessel i.e. to keep clear from the vessel being overtaken, the vessel B. 
The responsibility of vessel B is to keep its heading and speed. However, due to the encounter of 
a third vessel C from port side, that has the responsibility give way to vessel A, the vessel A ends 
up in a situation where she both needs to give-way and keep her speed and heading. As the rules 
are starting to be contradicting, the navigators are required to solve the situation in an independent 
way. (John et al. 2013; Belcher 2012) The more traffic situation becomes dense and as long as 
there are no traffic separations schemes to direct traffic, contradictions in COLREGS start appear. 
Hence, to avoid collision will become independent interpretation of the situation by different ships 
and their navigators with the attempt to apply COLREGS with their best abilities according to 
their skills and situational awareness. The written rules are not necessarily capable anymore to 
cope with the increasing number of variables in the situation.  
Another example from shipping is the “Lifeboat Imbroglio” (Drouin, 2008). Drouin writes that 
since 1990’s with alarming regularity lifeboat accidents started to occur. (It is compulsory to have 
lifeboat exercises on a ship with regular intervals.) Even though some development work was 
done along the way, it took around 10 years before the matter was truly understood. In 2001, the 
UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) studied the UK’s merchant fleet accident re-
ports over the years and concluded that with entering confined spaces and falling overboard, life-
boat drills counted for 16% of all lives lost at sea in merchant ships within the UK database. 
During the investigated time of 1989 – 1999, 12 professional seafarers had lost their lives and 87 
persons were injured. All accidents occurred during compulsory training exercises with experi-
enced and qualified seafarers performing or supervising operations. Ironically, over the same pe-
riod there was no record of someone being saved by a lifeboat. Hence, the compulsory lifeboat 
drills statistically had killed more people than they had saved in an emergency. (Drouin, 2008, 9; 
MAIB, 2001) The MAIB report was backed up by Australian authorities and Norwegians esti-
mating that globally there are about 214 000 drills a year causing 1 000 accidents and as many as 
half causing fatalities. (Marsk Training, Launching a revolution) 
Another safety paradox has been pointed out by Reason (2000, 5), that when the safety develop-
ment work is ongoing, the well-defended and safe systems can become victims of their own suc-
cess. The system safety has improved by learning from the negative data collected, but as the 
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amount of negative incidents decline, the development slows down as there is no data to steer 
towards a safer state. Things like “learn from your mistakes” becomes obsolete if there are no 
mistakes to learn from. But this still does not mean, that accidents will not happen. 
There is no absolute safety nor are there perfect systems. Safety is not a state that is once achieved 
and then left alone, but something that needs to be created again and again in constant striving. 
The situation at hand is different from the next, which makes safety also dynamic in nature. As 
the reality we live in is created of events interweaved together and their constant change and 
interaction, the causes and their effects are not always evident. The way we respond to an event 
changes the nature of the event, therefore the actions we take in a situation has consequences. It 
changes the way the situation evolves, which again affects the way we respond to it. This makes 
safety also situationally bound. (Hanén and Huhtinen, 13)  
Change does no always appear as a consequence of actions taken. It can also emerge due to com-
plexity and interconnectivity of different elements in a certain time and space. We create rules 
and regulations to ensure safety, but end up in a situation where the rules we create start to con-
tradict with each other and suddenly blindly following the written rules will eventually decrease 
the level of safety. There are the paradoxes of safety and without accepting them as a part of safety 
development work, it will be hard to achieve true safety culture. (Hanén and Huhtinen, 2013, 13; 
Reason 2000, 3-14) 
 
3 Assessing risk 
 
Safety development relies quite far on risk assessments. Risk assessment is a systematical way to 
assess risks related to an activity. It includes steps to identify possible and relevant threats and 
hazards as well as opportunities, understanding and calculating the potential causes, probabilities 
and consequences. Risk assessment is a supporting tool for decision making to select the appro-
priate course of action to confront the potential future events while keeping the relevant require-
ments in mind. It is about probabilities of the future specifying what is at stake while pursuing a 
certain goal. Risk assessment is also about gathering data and transforming the learned infor-
mation into an input that can be used in decision making in order to manage and control these 
risks. (Aven et al., 2014) 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), originally influenced by offshore platform explosion in North 
Sea, the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988, aims at enhancing safety in the maritime domain. FSA is 
using risk analysis and cost benefit assessment in a structured and systematic way to support 
decision making weighting risks and risk control measures against cost effectiveness and safety 
regulations, proposed changes and existing standards. FSA is an important tool for maritime in-
dustry to enhance maritime safety. International Maritime Organization (IMO) defines it as: “ra-
tional and systematic process for assessing the risks associated with shipping activity and for 
evaluating the costs and benefits of reducing the risks”. (IMO, Formal Safety Assessment)  
However, predicting possible hazards, their probabilities of occurring and the impacts, if realized, 
is not exact science. Risk assessments include facts but also assumptions about the future events. 
Also the complexity and intractability of systems introduce uncertainties and in spite of the best 
effort to make sense of and predict system operations in detail, it often turns out that the predic-
tions are imperfect to some extent. Uncertainty arises from not knowing exactly what is going to 
happen and what kind of impact will there be. Hence, creating exact measures for mitigating, 
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controlling or eliminating risk are often also approximate. (Aven, 2015; Aven and Krohn, 2013; 
Hollnagel, 2014; Grote, 2015; Gregory and Shanahan, 2010). 
 
4 Risk management and uncertainties - The Black Swans and Perfect Storms 
 
The severity of a risk is usually calculated by probabilities i.e. how likely it would happen and 
what kind of impact it could have. Aven and Krohn (2013) argue, that probability is just one way 
to describe uncertainty and that is too narrow. Aven and Krohn (2013) also continue, that proba-
bilities for the same event could be the same, but what could result in a different outcome is the 
knowledge available when making safety critical decisions. Calculating probabilities includes as-
sumptions about the future and judgements based on these assumptions, but they are still predic-
tions and assumptions, not absolute facts.  
Last decade of research on risk and uncertainty has also been influenced by Nassim Taleb and his 
book “The Black Swan” (Grote, 2014). Taleb’s Black Swan is an event, that emerges as a surprise, 
has major effects and  due to our human nature, we tend to make simplistic explanations after-
wards with the benefit of hindsight (Taleb, 2007, p. xviii). The idea of Taleb’s Black Swans is 
not all about negative events like the 9/11, but also about the ability to exploit positive opportu-
nities like the success of Google or the World Wide Web. According to him, we should not try to 
predict Black Swans, but to build robustness towards negative events arguing that: “what we do 
not know is far more significant than what we do know” (Taleb, 2007, p. xix). 
Aven (2015) discusses also the concept of the Black Swan. He argues that these surprising ex-
treme events called Black Swans should be included in risk management. Aven (2015, p. 84) sees 
Black Swans as three different types: a) the unknown unknown (where no-one knows nor can 
anticipate or imagine), b) the unknown known (where we do not know but someone else does) 
and c) events that are judged to have negligible probability of occurrence and thus are not believed 
to occur. He argues, that we need new principles and methods to cover also the black swans. We 
cannot build a perfect system nor is there such a thing than absolute safety. Surprises always 
occur. Safety has to be managed another way than only compliance.  
Paté-Cornell (2012) again describes “Black Swans” as unthinkable and the extremely unlikely 
events that cannot be anticipated and adds “Perfect Storms” that are a combination of knowns that 
occur regularly, but their conjunction is very rare. An example of these Perfect Storms could be 
the Japanese tragedy of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. She comments (2012, p. 1824) that 
these can also be seen as lack of proactive risk management and raises the question how to address 
these rare events which cannot be foreseen based on signals and existing knowledge. 
In the recent years the importance of including uncertainties into risk management has been 
acknowledged. Different methods how to understand complex socio-technical systems and un-
certainties arising from their operation have been developed such as the Bayesian networks (for 
further details see e.g. Hänninen, 2014), STAMP (see e.g. Levenson, 2012) and FRAM (see e.g. 
Hollnagel, 2012). However, these methods allow to study the systems and their operation as well 
as possible hazards and risks with the luxury of time. They build a stock of common knowledge 
about system safety, create operational framework and guidelines for action in a critical situation, 
but lack to address sufficiently the risk assessment in a dynamic and emergent (as in unpredicta-
ble), safety-critical situation, when the black swans have landed and perfect storms are blowing 
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at sea. Therefore, the following chapter will discuss the concept of dynamic risk assessment and 
the need for it in the maritime domain. 
 
5 Dynamic risk assessment 
 
In the 1990s, followed by high-profile fire-fighter deaths in service, Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) in London, United Kingdom started to develop risk management of the firefighting oper-
ation. The deaths of firefighters in service highlighted the need for better risk assessment while at 
the field working in hazardous situations. Differing from the traditional, predictive risk assess-
ment, dynamic risk assessment is supporting decision making on the spot when the decision maker 
is in a changing, unpredictable situation. (Jacobs, 2010) 
Shipping is considered to be quite safe form of transportation, but seafaring is still seen as one of 
the most hazardous occupations with mortality rates considerably higher than for land based oc-
cupations (Kudsen, 2009; Hänninen, 2014). European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) states in 
their annual overview (EMSA, 2015, p.16), that for example in the year 2014 there were 99 very 
serious casualties with a total loss of a ship or a death or severe damage to the environment. In 
2014 there were 765 serious casualties involving e.g. fire, collision, grounding, hull damage re-
sulting in the ship being unfit to proceed, pollution or need for external assistance. And the num-
ber for less serious casualties and incidents was over 2000. The number of serious casualties has 
risen in the resent years and it is expected to possibly rise in the year 2015. (EMSA, 2015 p. 14-
16) So even the number of ships with very serious and serious accidents is not high compared to 
the amount of ships sailing at sea on a yearly basis (approx. 60 000 ships), the numbers tell that 
seafarers do face hazardous situations, whether resulting in casualties or being near miss situa-
tions. 
DRA is a tool for rapid decision making in an operational environment where the risk arises and 
the environment is dynamically changing rather than the actual risk itself (Asbury and Jacobs, 
2014). As an example of this could be the chemical spill on a vessel at sea. The risk being the 
threat towards human health, environmental pollution and damage to property stays generally the 
same, but the environment changes over time due to actions taken, weather conditions, ship status, 
the development of a chemical spill and resources available in each moment. Hence, also deci-
sions and performance are adjusted to occurring situational needs. 
The operation of an organization is influenced by the environment it operates in. Understanding 
the business operations holistically is essential for assessing the risks faced by the organization. 
Asbury and Jacobs (2012, 22) divides risk management into three different levels introducing the 
3-level risk management model for making decisions and assessing risks.  The more time con-
suming levels are done first at a strategical and operational level. Risk assessment at the dynamic 
level is about real-time decisions in ad hoc situations. The strategical and operational levels create 
a framework within which to operate and guide decision making on the ground. The workers are 
empowered to make decisions, but are also expected to explain them. The risk assessments and 
decisions done at this level are usually done under time pressure taking only seconds to minutes 
(possibly hours) to decide which course of action to take. (Asbury and Jacobs, 2012) Even though 
these levels are clearly different, they should all contribute to one and other. Decisions made at 
the dynamic level should contribute to the defined business conduct done on the strategical level 
and the operational level should adequately ensure that the employees are empowered and trained 
towards the common goal. Therefore, efficient and correct feedback is important between the all 
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tree levels.  The risk assessments and decisions done on a dynamic level are responding to the 
uncertainties arising from a situation, which the two levels above have not been able to foresee, 
address or control (e.g. such as time and magnitude of an accident).  
Hanén (2017, p. 104-105) also point out self-organization in complex systems. He states, that 
emergence brings out self-organization in a complex system even in situations with no control. 
This is enabled by the interaction of different components of the system. Different interactions 
and decisions done on the local level makes the system or situation unpredictable to a certain 
extent, but as the local decision making and action evolves through learning and interaction be-
tween different components, order starts to appear to the whole. The system responds to the needs 
of operational environment by attempting to adapt to prevailing situational needs and tries to 
control operation through acquiring information and feed-back loops. In order to survive in a 
complex environment, the systems needs to imitate its operational environment by becoming 
complex itself and through self-organization gains more adaptability. Therefore, decentralization 
of decision making and responsibility are needed all through the organization from the top down 
highlighting the need for experience based professionalism. Dynamic situations call for flexibility 
and self-organization, decentralization of decision making and feed back loops for successful op-
eration in complex systems. 
The strength of DRA is in its flexibility. DRA method allows to make decisions such as whether 
to comply with existing ways of working or make adjustments when and if the situation calls for 
it. (Okoli et al. 2016; Jacobs, 2010). International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG) is a 
code for ships transporting packed dangerous goods. It has guidelines for emergency operations, 
first response, emergency first aid and general information about chemicals. IMDG Code is com-
pulsory and acts as a guideline for shipping companies, when making their ship specific emer-
gency procedures. But, in an chemical accident, even though all the correct procedures in place, 
captain of a vessel is still left with ad hoc decision making. Most likely these decisions are made 
under high level of stress on a short time scale often with a limited amount of factual information 
about the incident and its proceeding. Even the risks of such an incident can be predicted to some 
extent, predicting the true development of such a situation is difficult due to many different vari-
ables from weather conditions to HNS properties, location at sea to resources available and so on. 
Therefore, due to unforeseen situations and high level of uncertainty, flexibility is needed which 
allows adaptation and modification of behavior and decision making to situational needs as they 
arise (Grote, 2015).  
This flexibility has implications. Decisions in a situation that has a high level of routine, stand-
ardization and predictability can be covered with compliance to established ways of working. But, 
when decisions are made under high level of uncertainty in ad hoc situations, performance adap-
tation, improvisation and sometimes even ignoring the rules might be needed. Okoli et al. (2016) 
conducted a research about experienced firefighters problem-solving strategies at an incident 
scene. The results show that decisions made are mainly adaptive and skill-based, where modifi-
cations and refinements to standard ways of doing are needed. The fire fighters reported, that 
sometimes they need to neglect or adapt firefighting rules to suit the current circumstances in 
order to ensure safety. Therefore, Okoli et. al (2016, p. 17) also state, that “adaptive decisions 
extend beyond merely ‘knowing that’ to also include, more importantly, ‘knowing how’ and/or 
‘knowing when’”. These kind of situations both offer a place for learning, but also require appro-
priate skills and knowledge of operator to choose the correct course of action. It is important that 
the decision maker firstly recognizes the essential cues and information from the environment as 
 73 
 
 
 
 
well as has the capability to make sense of them, to interpret and use them to determine the right 
courses of action in a timely manner (Grote, 2015; Okoli et al., 2014).  
Similarly for the DRA to be effective and actually result in the right courses of action, the crew 
using DRA need to understand and recognize the correct cues and stimuli in the situation at hand. 
They need to understand what is a hazard and a risk and what is not as well as make correct 
judgement calls about when to comply with rules and existing best practices and when to adjust 
performance and improvise, if needed. Understanding the limits of oneself, the physical and psy-
chological strength, is also highlighted. Employees need to have understanding about when the 
risk is unacceptable and to remove themselves from the situation and report it further. Therefore, 
the behavior and competence of employees are a vital part of successful implementation of DRA 
(Spencer, 2005; Jacobs, 2010). The questions of what is seen as a risk, what kind of risks are 
acceptable and when to retrieve from the situation are a question of risk perception, the way an 
individual subjectively judges and understands risk. These can be influenced by safety culture 
and organizational core values. (Asbury and Jacobs, 2014)  
 
6 Core Values 
 
Core values are usually the way an organization wants to conduct business. They are about the 
operational philosophies and principles that guide the internal conduct, influence the organiza-
tional culture and how the organization relates to the outside world. The core values and opera-
tional philosophies also define what is accepted and what is not as well as what kind of risk taking 
is expected in a safety critical situation of an employee. Therefore, the core values help to estab-
lish risk tolerance levels specifying what kind of risks to take within certain operational bounda-
ries. These core values need to be understood and acquired well by the whole organization, which 
supports a shared understanding of what kind of behavior is expected in relation to risk. (Okoli et 
al. 2016; Asbury and Jacobs, 2012) As an example of this in a HNS SAR operation is that the 
primary objective is to save human lives, which as a statement directs decision making and re-
source allocation towards saving people and if needed, places secondary priority to environment 
protection. An example is in IMDG Code, where emergency procedures suggest jettisoning chem-
icals over board to save human life if there is no other alternative. (IMDG Code Supplement, 
2014, p. 57) 
At sea, there is something that can be related to core values, but which often goes beyond the 
organizational business conduct. This is Seamanship. ‘Seamanship’ is in general the art of han-
dling a ship in all conditions and weather, having the skills specific to seafaring and it is used in 
rule making to cover in the areas of uncertainties and encounters of unforeseen. Good seamanship 
is a fundamental principle, a core value of seafarers, still research show that seafarers feel that 
their seamanship is not necessarily valued (Antonsen, 2009; Knudsen, 2009; Lappalainen 2016). 
The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS, Rule 8) define also 
in rules to avoid collision to take any action according to rules and if circumstances admit, be 
positive, maneuver in ample time and “with due regard to the observance of good seamanship”.  
What actually is good seamanship has no specific universal definition, but Knudsen (2009, p. 
295) defines seamanship: “as a blend of professional knowledge, professional pride, and experi-
ence-based common sense” that can be seen more than what is learned in school. They are the 
skills and knowledge of a seafaring profession, but also a question of attitude, intuitive decision 
 74 
 
 
 
 
making and accepted behavior. Therefore, they are values that guide seafaring and could be used 
in flexible rule making to guide and constrain human behavior and decision making. 
 
7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Safety has two different aspects that are both vital and should equally be addressed in maritime 
safety development. The strategical aspect, including issues like international and national legis-
lative framework, training and human resource issues, company policies and strategies, techno-
logical development and solutions, developments in physical operational environment etc. These 
all influence, facilitate and resource the decision making and action on a tactical level. At this 
level the seafarers face and respond to emerging situations ad hoc, whether being just another day 
at work or safety critical situation. Seafarers use their skills, knowledge and given resources to 
overcome emerging obstacles ensuring safety at the same time as they are striving to successfully 
accomplish the task at hand. The better their work is facilitated from a safety point of view, the 
better it will be for them to ensure and implement safety on daily basis. Therefore, without fully 
focusing on both aspects of strategical and tactical aspect of safety, true safety will be difficult to 
accomplish. 
Safety is dynamic in nature. It emerges in the interaction between the components, between the 
operational environment of the situation and the actions of the crew. The particular situation at 
hand evolves as the crew takes action and the feed back signals guide next steps which again have 
an impact on the whole situation. Safety is also situationally bound. Action again follows deci-
sions, whether rationally planned or rapid and intuitive. Well working equipment is important, 
but it is vital also to understand how to use it correctly. Available information is of no use, if there 
are no skills to make sense of it. Safety is only partially in the written word, in the legislation, 
rules and regulations or in the physical surroundings. The rest simply comes from the actions of 
the operators in a given moment, in the interaction between different components of a system and 
their ability of make use of what is at hand. And, the as we strive for safer systems, increasing 
complexity inevitably introduces safety paradoxes where what we have done to improve safety 
might end up deteriorating it.  
Safety being an emergent property of a complex system, dynamic and emergent in nature that 
needs constant striving for, there might be a need for new tools and methods to ensure safety. 
Dynamic Risk Assessment could be a useful method being fast and flexible, which is needed in a 
fast evolving safety critical situation. However, it does need further research and studying, as 
what suits the firefighters, might not automatically suit the seafarers. If the uncertainties of mari-
time safety needs to be addressed, they cannot be covered with the same predictive and time 
consuming, traditional risk assessment tools.  
When considering the use of DRA and principles of a effective way to respond to a complex 
situation, one cannot ignore the fact that it does support decentralization of decision making and 
emphasizes the need for flexibility to correctly respond to the situation at hand. But it is also 
needed to ensure that the energies are directed towards a common goal.  How do we ensure that 
the decisions made are correct especially if there are no specific guidelines to direct the action? 
For example, vessels do have check lists for emergency procedures, which are based on regula-
tions, therefore there are answers to questions on What needs to be done. In an incident, there are 
check lists, which can contain a point: 1) Make an initial assessment of the situation and analyze 
risks. But, what is lacking is the How?. How to continuously assess the hazardous situation at 
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hand and analyze the risks from an evolving situation. How to be creative and improvise when 
needed and make the correct judgements about when to bend or even ignore the rules and when 
to comply.  These could be the questions also for educational sector. How to educate self-regula-
tive and empowered employees, who independently can make correct decisions in a emergent, 
safety critical situation under pressure and high risk. And this also inevitably leads to the question 
of leadership as empowered, safety conscious employees operating also within flexible rules 
might need another type of leadership than those working with high level of standardization and 
routines and compliance to established ways of working.    
Striving for excellence and zero accidents is a worthy goal. However, hypothesis like we cannot 
create perfect systems and there is not such a thing, than absolute safety, cannot be ignored. To 
manage safety in an area of flexible rule making and performance adaptation could need new 
tools to ensure safety than what are used in a safety culture of compliance to established ways of 
working. Seafaring expertise called seamanship could be a key to manage flexibility and cope 
with uncertainties, as a core value to direct and control human behavior.  
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